This header has been removed for the following reasons:
- Header is misplaced. 'xxx_types.h' headers should be placed in the 'hal'
component.
- The 'usb_xxx_endpoint_t' should be placed in the 'xxx_struct.h' header.
- Renamed usb_otg_periph.h/c to usb_dwc_periph.h/c to match naming convention
of other DWC OTG related files
- Added compatibility header for usb_otg_periph.h
usb_pins.h and usb_periph.h/c lists mappings of USB DWC signals to GPIOs used
to connect to external FSLS PHYs. However, those signals can be routed to any
GPIOs via the GPIO matrix. Thus, these mapping are meaningless and have been
deprecated.
Enable FTM Responder mode for ESP32C6. Update wifi libs with below -
1. Break FTM State Machine code into separate functions
2. Use dynamic allocation for FTM session to save memory
3. Add API to get FTM report instead of event based mechanism
4. Add FTM Request retry and comeback support
esp_wifi: Handle case when AP advertises WPA, WPA2 and WPA3 securities simultaneously and other bugfixes (Backport v5.1)
See merge request espressif/esp-idf!29689
Make sure that WPS registrar public APIs do not modify supplicant
data in application task context. Execute API functionlity in eloop
context to prevent protential race conditions.
Avoid dereferencing a dangling function pointer in 'eap_server_sm_deinit()'.
This issue arises when hostap unregisteres EAP methods before it removes
the server state machine for station.
* Improvements in scan and connect path as per specifications along with
minor bugfixes
* When AP advertises all PSK modes (WPA, WPA2 and WPA3), make sure that
station treats it as WPA2_WPA3_PSK mixed mode.
The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
configuration parameter option:
'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
* 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
* 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
(private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
not used (default)
* 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
