esp-idf/components/bootloader_support/src/esp_image_format.c
Vikram Dattu e155cd7a78 Add mmu pages available check in non-secure image hash check path.
Made MMU pages available check in `esp_image_format.c`
This now makes it possible to map and process bootoader image as well in chunks when image doesn't fit completely into available free pages.

Signed-off-by: Vikram Dattu <vikram.dattu@espressif.com>
2019-07-19 10:08:39 +05:30

647 lines
23 KiB
C

// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <rom/rtc.h>
#include <soc/cpu.h>
#include <esp_image_format.h>
#include <esp_secure_boot.h>
#include <esp_log.h>
#include <esp_spi_flash.h>
#include <bootloader_flash.h>
#include <bootloader_random.h>
#include <bootloader_sha.h>
#include "bootloader_util.h"
/* Checking signatures as part of verifying images is necessary:
- Always if secure boot is enabled
- Differently in bootloader and/or app, depending on kconfig
*/
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT
#define SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE
#endif
#else /* !BOOTLOADER_BUILD */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE
#define SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE
#endif
#endif
static const char *TAG = "esp_image";
#define HASH_LEN ESP_IMAGE_HASH_LEN
#define SIXTEEN_MB 0x1000000
#define ESP_ROM_CHECKSUM_INITIAL 0xEF
/* Headroom to ensure between stack SP (at time of checking) and data loaded from flash */
#define STACK_LOAD_HEADROOM 32768
/* Mmap source address mask */
#define MMAP_ALIGNED_MASK 0x0000FFFF
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
/* 64 bits of random data to obfuscate loaded RAM with, until verification is complete
(Means loaded code isn't executable until after the secure boot check.)
*/
static uint32_t ram_obfs_value[2];
/* Range of IRAM used by the loader, defined in ld script */
extern int _loader_text_start;
extern int _loader_text_end;
#endif
/* Return true if load_addr is an address the bootloader should load into */
static bool should_load(uint32_t load_addr);
/* Return true if load_addr is an address the bootloader should map via flash cache */
static bool should_map(uint32_t load_addr);
/* Load or verify a segment */
static esp_err_t process_segment(int index, uint32_t flash_addr, esp_image_segment_header_t *header, bool silent, bool do_load, bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, uint32_t *checksum);
/* split segment and verify if data_len is too long */
static esp_err_t process_segment_data(intptr_t load_addr, uint32_t data_addr, uint32_t data_len, bool do_load, bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, uint32_t *checksum);
/* Verify the main image header */
static esp_err_t verify_image_header(uint32_t src_addr, const esp_image_header_t *image, bool silent);
/* Verify a segment header */
static esp_err_t verify_segment_header(int index, const esp_image_segment_header_t *segment, uint32_t segment_data_offs, bool silent);
/* Log-and-fail macro for use in esp_image_load */
#define FAIL_LOAD(...) do { \
if (!silent) { \
ESP_LOGE(TAG, __VA_ARGS__); \
} \
goto err; \
} \
while(0)
static esp_err_t verify_checksum(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, uint32_t checksum_word, esp_image_metadata_t *data);
static esp_err_t __attribute__((unused)) verify_secure_boot_signature(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, esp_image_metadata_t *data);
static esp_err_t __attribute__((unused)) verify_simple_hash(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, esp_image_metadata_t *data);
static esp_err_t image_load(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
bool do_load = (mode == ESP_IMAGE_LOAD);
#else
bool do_load = false; // Can't load the image in app mode
#endif
bool silent = (mode == ESP_IMAGE_VERIFY_SILENT);
esp_err_t err = ESP_OK;
// checksum the image a word at a time. This shaves 30-40ms per MB of image size
uint32_t checksum_word = ESP_ROM_CHECKSUM_INITIAL;
bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle = NULL;
if (data == NULL || part == NULL) {
return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
}
if (part->size > SIXTEEN_MB) {
err = ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
FAIL_LOAD("partition size 0x%x invalid, larger than 16MB", part->size);
}
bzero(data, sizeof(esp_image_metadata_t));
data->start_addr = part->offset;
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "reading image header @ 0x%x", data->start_addr);
err = bootloader_flash_read(data->start_addr, &data->image, sizeof(esp_image_header_t), true);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
goto err;
}
// Calculate SHA-256 of image if secure boot is on, or if image has a hash appended
#ifdef SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE
if (1) {
#else
if (data->image.hash_appended) {
#endif
sha_handle = bootloader_sha256_start();
if (sha_handle == NULL) {
return ESP_ERR_NO_MEM;
}
bootloader_sha256_data(sha_handle, &data->image, sizeof(esp_image_header_t));
}
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "image header: 0x%02x 0x%02x 0x%02x 0x%02x %08x",
data->image.magic,
data->image.segment_count,
data->image.spi_mode,
data->image.spi_size,
data->image.entry_addr);
err = verify_image_header(data->start_addr, &data->image, silent);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
goto err;
}
if (data->image.segment_count > ESP_IMAGE_MAX_SEGMENTS) {
FAIL_LOAD("image at 0x%x segment count %d exceeds max %d",
data->start_addr, data->image.segment_count, ESP_IMAGE_MAX_SEGMENTS);
}
uint32_t next_addr = data->start_addr + sizeof(esp_image_header_t);
for(int i = 0; i < data->image.segment_count; i++) {
esp_image_segment_header_t *header = &data->segments[i];
ESP_LOGV(TAG, "loading segment header %d at offset 0x%x", i, next_addr);
err = process_segment(i, next_addr, header, silent, do_load, sha_handle, &checksum_word);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
goto err;
}
next_addr += sizeof(esp_image_segment_header_t);
data->segment_data[i] = next_addr;
next_addr += header->data_len;
}
// Segments all loaded, verify length
uint32_t end_addr = next_addr;
if (end_addr < data->start_addr) {
FAIL_LOAD("image offset has wrapped");
}
data->image_len = end_addr - data->start_addr;
ESP_LOGV(TAG, "image start 0x%08x end of last section 0x%08x", data->start_addr, end_addr);
if (!esp_cpu_in_ocd_debug_mode()) {
err = verify_checksum(sha_handle, checksum_word, data);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
goto err;
}
}
if (data->image_len > part->size) {
FAIL_LOAD("Image length %d doesn't fit in partition length %d", data->image_len, part->size);
}
bool is_bootloader = (data->start_addr == ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET);
/* For secure boot, we don't verify signature on bootloaders.
For non-secure boot, we don't verify any SHA-256 hash appended to the bootloader because esptool.py may have
rewritten the header - rely on esptool.py having verified the bootloader at flashing time, instead.
*/
if (!is_bootloader) {
#ifdef SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE
// secure boot images have a signature appended
err = verify_secure_boot_signature(sha_handle, data);
#else
// No secure boot, but SHA-256 can be appended for basic corruption detection
if (sha_handle != NULL && !esp_cpu_in_ocd_debug_mode()) {
err = verify_simple_hash(sha_handle, data);
}
#endif // SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE
} else { // is_bootloader
// bootloader may still have a sha256 digest handle open
if (sha_handle != NULL) {
bootloader_sha256_finish(sha_handle, NULL);
}
}
if (data->image.hash_appended) {
const void *hash = bootloader_mmap(data->start_addr + data->image_len - HASH_LEN, HASH_LEN);
if (hash == NULL) {
err = ESP_FAIL;
goto err;
}
memcpy(data->image_digest, hash, HASH_LEN);
bootloader_munmap(hash);
}
sha_handle = NULL;
if (err != ESP_OK) {
goto err;
}
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
if (do_load) { // Need to deobfuscate RAM
for (int i = 0; i < data->image.segment_count; i++) {
uint32_t load_addr = data->segments[i].load_addr;
if (should_load(load_addr)) {
uint32_t *loaded = (uint32_t *)load_addr;
for (int j = 0; j < data->segments[i].data_len/sizeof(uint32_t); j++) {
loaded[j] ^= (j & 1) ? ram_obfs_value[0] : ram_obfs_value[1];
}
}
}
}
#endif
// Success!
return ESP_OK;
err:
if (err == ESP_OK) {
err = ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
if (sha_handle != NULL) {
// Need to finish the hash process to free the handle
bootloader_sha256_finish(sha_handle, NULL);
}
// Prevent invalid/incomplete data leaking out
bzero(data, sizeof(esp_image_metadata_t));
return err;
}
esp_err_t bootloader_load_image(const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
return image_load(ESP_IMAGE_LOAD, part, data);
#else
return ESP_FAIL;
#endif
}
esp_err_t esp_image_verify(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
return image_load(mode, part, data);
}
esp_err_t esp_image_load(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data) __attribute__((alias("esp_image_verify")));
static esp_err_t verify_image_header(uint32_t src_addr, const esp_image_header_t *image, bool silent)
{
esp_err_t err = ESP_OK;
if (image->magic != ESP_IMAGE_HEADER_MAGIC) {
if (!silent) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image at 0x%x has invalid magic byte", src_addr);
}
err = ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
if (!silent) {
if (image->spi_mode > ESP_IMAGE_SPI_MODE_SLOW_READ) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "image at 0x%x has invalid SPI mode %d", src_addr, image->spi_mode);
}
if (image->spi_speed > ESP_IMAGE_SPI_SPEED_80M) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "image at 0x%x has invalid SPI speed %d", src_addr, image->spi_speed);
}
if (image->spi_size > ESP_IMAGE_FLASH_SIZE_MAX) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "image at 0x%x has invalid SPI size %d", src_addr, image->spi_size);
}
}
return err;
}
static esp_err_t process_segment(int index, uint32_t flash_addr, esp_image_segment_header_t *header, bool silent, bool do_load, bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, uint32_t *checksum)
{
esp_err_t err;
/* read segment header */
err = bootloader_flash_read(flash_addr, header, sizeof(esp_image_segment_header_t), true);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_flash_read failed at 0x%08x", flash_addr);
return err;
}
if (sha_handle != NULL) {
bootloader_sha256_data(sha_handle, header, sizeof(esp_image_segment_header_t));
}
intptr_t load_addr = header->load_addr;
uint32_t data_len = header->data_len;
uint32_t data_addr = flash_addr + sizeof(esp_image_segment_header_t);
ESP_LOGV(TAG, "segment data length 0x%x data starts 0x%x", data_len, data_addr);
err = verify_segment_header(index, header, data_addr, silent);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
return err;
}
if (data_len % 4 != 0) {
FAIL_LOAD("unaligned segment length 0x%x", data_len);
}
bool is_mapping = should_map(load_addr);
do_load = do_load && should_load(load_addr);
if (!silent) {
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "segment %d: paddr=0x%08x vaddr=0x%08x size=0x%05x (%6d) %s",
index, data_addr, load_addr,
data_len, data_len,
(do_load)?"load":(is_mapping)?"map":"");
}
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
/* Before loading segment, check it doesn't clobber bootloader RAM. */
if (do_load) {
const intptr_t load_end = load_addr + data_len;
if (load_end <= (intptr_t) SOC_DIRAM_DRAM_HIGH) {
/* Writing to DRAM */
intptr_t sp = (intptr_t)get_sp();
if (load_end > sp - STACK_LOAD_HEADROOM) {
/* Bootloader .data/.rodata/.bss is above the stack, so this
* also checks that we aren't overwriting these segments.
*
* TODO: This assumes specific arrangement of sections we have
* in the ESP32. Rewrite this in a generic way to support other
* layouts.
*/
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Segment %d end address 0x%08x too high (bootloader stack 0x%08x limit 0x%08x)",
index, load_end, sp, sp - STACK_LOAD_HEADROOM);
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
} else {
/* Writing to IRAM */
const intptr_t loader_iram_start = (intptr_t) &_loader_text_start;
const intptr_t loader_iram_end = (intptr_t) &_loader_text_end;
if (bootloader_util_regions_overlap(loader_iram_start, loader_iram_end,
load_addr, load_end)) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Segment %d (0x%08x-0x%08x) overlaps bootloader IRAM (0x%08x-0x%08x)",
index, load_addr, load_end, loader_iram_start, loader_iram_end);
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
}
}
#endif // BOOTLOADER_BUILD
uint32_t free_page_count = bootloader_mmap_get_free_pages();
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "free data page_count 0x%08x", free_page_count);
int32_t data_len_remain = data_len;
while (data_len_remain > 0) {
uint32_t offset_page = ((data_addr & MMAP_ALIGNED_MASK) != 0) ? 1 : 0;
/* Data we could map in case we are not aligned to PAGE boundary is one page size lesser. */
data_len = MIN(data_len_remain, ((free_page_count - offset_page) * SPI_FLASH_MMU_PAGE_SIZE));
err = process_segment_data(load_addr, data_addr, data_len, do_load, sha_handle, checksum);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
return err;
}
data_addr += data_len;
data_len_remain -= data_len;
}
return ESP_OK;
err:
if (err == ESP_OK) {
err = ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
return err;
}
static esp_err_t process_segment_data(intptr_t load_addr, uint32_t data_addr, uint32_t data_len, bool do_load, bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, uint32_t *checksum)
{
const uint32_t *data = (const uint32_t *)bootloader_mmap(data_addr, data_len);
if(!data) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed",
data_addr, data_len);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
// Set up the obfuscation value to use for loading
while (ram_obfs_value[0] == 0 || ram_obfs_value[1] == 0) {
bootloader_fill_random(ram_obfs_value, sizeof(ram_obfs_value));
}
uint32_t *dest = (uint32_t *)load_addr;
#endif
const uint32_t *src = data;
for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i += 4) {
int w_i = i/4; // Word index
uint32_t w = src[w_i];
*checksum ^= w;
#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
if (do_load) {
dest[w_i] = w ^ ((w_i & 1) ? ram_obfs_value[0] : ram_obfs_value[1]);
}
#endif
// SHA_CHUNK determined experimentally as the optimum size
// to call bootloader_sha256_data() with. This is a bit
// counter-intuitive, but it's ~3ms better than using the
// SHA256 block size.
const size_t SHA_CHUNK = 1024;
if (sha_handle != NULL && i % SHA_CHUNK == 0) {
bootloader_sha256_data(sha_handle, &src[w_i],
MIN(SHA_CHUNK, data_len - i));
}
}
bootloader_munmap(data);
return ESP_OK;
}
static esp_err_t verify_segment_header(int index, const esp_image_segment_header_t *segment, uint32_t segment_data_offs, bool silent)
{
if ((segment->data_len & 3) != 0
|| segment->data_len >= SIXTEEN_MB) {
if (!silent) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "invalid segment length 0x%x", segment->data_len);
}
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
uint32_t load_addr = segment->load_addr;
bool map_segment = should_map(load_addr);
/* Check that flash cache mapped segment aligns correctly from flash to its mapped address,
relative to the 64KB page mapping size.
*/
ESP_LOGV(TAG, "segment %d map_segment %d segment_data_offs 0x%x load_addr 0x%x",
index, map_segment, segment_data_offs, load_addr);
if (map_segment
&& ((segment_data_offs % SPI_FLASH_MMU_PAGE_SIZE) != (load_addr % SPI_FLASH_MMU_PAGE_SIZE))) {
if (!silent) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Segment %d load address 0x%08x, doesn't match data 0x%08x",
index, load_addr, segment_data_offs);
}
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
return ESP_OK;
}
static bool should_map(uint32_t load_addr)
{
return (load_addr >= SOC_IROM_LOW && load_addr < SOC_IROM_HIGH)
|| (load_addr >= SOC_DROM_LOW && load_addr < SOC_DROM_HIGH);
}
static bool should_load(uint32_t load_addr)
{
/* Reload the RTC memory segments whenever a non-deepsleep reset
is occurring */
bool load_rtc_memory = rtc_get_reset_reason(0) != DEEPSLEEP_RESET;
if (should_map(load_addr)) {
return false;
}
if (load_addr < 0x10000000) {
// Reserved for non-loaded addresses.
// Current reserved values are
// 0x0 (padding block)
// 0x4 (unused, but reserved for an MD5 block)
return false;
}
if (!load_rtc_memory) {
if (load_addr >= SOC_RTC_IRAM_LOW && load_addr < SOC_RTC_IRAM_HIGH) {
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Skipping RTC fast memory segment at 0x%08x\n", load_addr);
return false;
}
if (load_addr >= SOC_RTC_DRAM_LOW && load_addr < SOC_RTC_DRAM_HIGH) {
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Skipping RTC fast memory segment at 0x%08x\n", load_addr);
return false;
}
if (load_addr >= SOC_RTC_DATA_LOW && load_addr < SOC_RTC_DATA_HIGH) {
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Skipping RTC slow memory segment at 0x%08x\n", load_addr);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
esp_err_t esp_image_verify_bootloader(uint32_t *length)
{
esp_image_metadata_t data;
esp_err_t err = esp_image_verify_bootloader_data(&data);
if (length != NULL) {
*length = (err == ESP_OK) ? data.image_len : 0;
}
return err;
}
esp_err_t esp_image_verify_bootloader_data(esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
if (data == NULL) {
return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
}
const esp_partition_pos_t bootloader_part = {
.offset = ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET,
.size = ESP_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET - ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET,
};
return esp_image_verify(ESP_IMAGE_VERIFY,
&bootloader_part,
data);
}
static esp_err_t verify_checksum(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, uint32_t checksum_word, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
uint32_t unpadded_length = data->image_len;
uint32_t length = unpadded_length + 1; // Add a byte for the checksum
length = (length + 15) & ~15; // Pad to next full 16 byte block
// Verify checksum
uint8_t buf[16];
esp_err_t err = bootloader_flash_read(data->start_addr + unpadded_length, buf, length - unpadded_length, true);
uint8_t calc = buf[length - unpadded_length - 1];
uint8_t checksum = (checksum_word >> 24)
^ (checksum_word >> 16)
^ (checksum_word >> 8)
^ (checksum_word >> 0);
if (err != ESP_OK || checksum != calc) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Checksum failed. Calculated 0x%x read 0x%x", checksum, calc);
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
if (sha_handle != NULL) {
bootloader_sha256_data(sha_handle, buf, length - unpadded_length);
}
if (data->image.hash_appended) {
// Account for the hash in the total image length
length += HASH_LEN;
}
data->image_len = length;
return ESP_OK;
}
static void debug_log_hash(const uint8_t *image_hash, const char *caption);
static esp_err_t verify_secure_boot_signature(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
uint8_t image_hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 };
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying image signature...");
// For secure boot, we calculate the signature hash over the whole file, which includes any "simple" hash
// appended to the image for corruption detection
if (data->image.hash_appended) {
const void *simple_hash = bootloader_mmap(data->start_addr + data->image_len - HASH_LEN, HASH_LEN);
bootloader_sha256_data(sha_handle, simple_hash, HASH_LEN);
bootloader_munmap(simple_hash);
}
bootloader_sha256_finish(sha_handle, image_hash);
// Log the hash for debugging
debug_log_hash(image_hash, "Calculated secure boot hash");
// Use hash to verify signature block
const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block = bootloader_mmap(data->start_addr + data->image_len, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
esp_err_t err = esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(sig_block, image_hash);
bootloader_munmap(sig_block);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure boot signature verification failed");
// Go back and check if the simple hash matches or not (we're off the fast path so we can re-hash the whole image now)
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Calculating simple hash to check for corruption...");
const void *whole_image = bootloader_mmap(data->start_addr, data->image_len - HASH_LEN);
if (whole_image != NULL) {
sha_handle = bootloader_sha256_start();
bootloader_sha256_data(sha_handle, whole_image, data->image_len - HASH_LEN);
bootloader_munmap(whole_image);
if (verify_simple_hash(sha_handle, data) != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "image corrupted on flash");
} else {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "image valid, signature bad");
}
}
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
return ESP_OK;
}
static esp_err_t verify_simple_hash(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
{
uint8_t image_hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 };
bootloader_sha256_finish(sha_handle, image_hash);
// Log the hash for debugging
debug_log_hash(image_hash, "Calculated hash");
// Simple hash for verification only
const void *hash = bootloader_mmap(data->start_addr + data->image_len - HASH_LEN, HASH_LEN);
if (memcmp(hash, image_hash, HASH_LEN) != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Image hash failed - image is corrupt");
debug_log_hash(hash, "Expected hash");
bootloader_munmap(hash);
return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
bootloader_munmap(hash);
return ESP_OK;
}
// Log a hash as a hex string
static void debug_log_hash(const uint8_t *image_hash, const char *label)
{
#if BOOT_LOG_LEVEL >= LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG
char hash_print[HASH_LEN * 2 + 1];
hash_print[HASH_LEN * 2] = 0;
bootloader_sha256_hex_to_str(hash_print, image_hash, HASH_LEN);
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "%s: %s", label, hash_print);
#endif
}