mirror of
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf.git
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9c87165bc8
- Backport(v3.3) of IDF MR!6122 - Modifies `smp_utils.c` to add check on encryption key size received from peer. - Modifies `esp_ble_gap_set_security_param` API to add minimum encryption key size requirement.
1622 lines
57 KiB
C
1622 lines
57 KiB
C
/******************************************************************************
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1999-2012 Broadcom Corporation
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*
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******************************************************************************/
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/******************************************************************************
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*
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* This file contains functions for the SMP L2CAP utility functions
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*
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******************************************************************************/
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#include "common/bt_target.h"
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#if SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE
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#include "stack/bt_types.h"
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//#include "bt_utils.h"
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#include <string.h>
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//#include <ctype.h>
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#include "stack/hcidefs.h"
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#include "stack/btm_ble_api.h"
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#include "stack/l2c_api.h"
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#include "l2c_int.h"
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#include "smp_int.h"
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#include "device/controller.h"
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#include "btm_int.h"
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#include "common/bte_appl.h"
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#define SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE 7
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#define SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE (BT_OCTET16_LEN + 1)
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#define SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE (BT_OCTET16_LEN + 1)
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#define SMP_INIT_CMD_SIZE (BT_OCTET16_LEN + 1)
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#define SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE (BT_OCTET16_LEN + 1)
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#define SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE (BT_OCTET8_LEN + 2 + 1)
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#define SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE (BT_OCTET16_LEN + 1)
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#define SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE (BD_ADDR_LEN + 1 + 1)
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#define SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE (BT_OCTET16_LEN + 1)
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#define SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE 2
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#define SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE 2
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#define SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + (2*BT_OCTET32_LEN))
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#define SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + BT_OCTET16_LEN /*Commitment*/)
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#define SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + BT_OCTET16_LEN /*DHKey Check*/)
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#define SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + 1 /*Notif Type*/)
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/* SMP command sizes per spec */
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static const UINT8 smp_cmd_size_per_spec[] = {
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0,
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SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE, /* 0x01: pairing request */
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SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE, /* 0x02: pairing response */
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SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
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SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE, /* 0x04: pairing random */
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SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE, /* 0x05: pairing failed */
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SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x06: encryption information */
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SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE, /* 0x07: master identification */
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SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x08: identity information */
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SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE, /* 0x09: identity address information */
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SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x0A: signing information */
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SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE, /* 0x0B: security request */
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SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
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SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */
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SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */
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SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
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};
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static BOOLEAN smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BOOLEAN smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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/* type for SMP command length validation functions */
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typedef BOOLEAN (*tSMP_CMD_LEN_VALID)(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BOOLEAN smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static const tSMP_CMD_LEN_VALID smp_cmd_len_is_valid[] = {
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid,
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x01: pairing request */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x02: pairing response */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x04: pairing random */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x05: pairing failed */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x06: encryption information */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x07: master identification */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x08: identity information */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x09: identity address information */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0A: signing information */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0B: security request */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */
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smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
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};
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/* type for SMP command parameter ranges validation functions */
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typedef BOOLEAN (*tSMP_CMD_PARAM_RANGES_VALID)(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BOOLEAN smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BOOLEAN smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static const tSMP_CMD_PARAM_RANGES_VALID smp_cmd_param_ranges_are_valid[] = {
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid,
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smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid, /* 0x01: pairing request */
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smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid, /* 0x02: pairing response */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x04: pairing random */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x05: pairing failed */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x06: encryption information */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x07: master identification */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x08: identity information */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x09: identity address information */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0A: signing information */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0B: security request */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */
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smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */
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smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
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};
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/* type for action functions */
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typedef BT_HDR *(*tSMP_CMD_ACT)(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_confirm_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_rand_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_fail(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_identity_info_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_security_request(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_signing_info_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_master_id_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_id_addr_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static const tSMP_CMD_ACT smp_cmd_build_act[] = {
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NULL,
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smp_build_pairing_cmd, /* 0x01: pairing request */
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smp_build_pairing_cmd, /* 0x02: pairing response */
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smp_build_confirm_cmd, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */
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smp_build_rand_cmd, /* 0x04: pairing random */
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smp_build_pairing_fail, /* 0x05: pairing failure */
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smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd, /* 0x06: encryption information */
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smp_build_master_id_cmd, /* 0x07: master identification */
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smp_build_identity_info_cmd, /* 0x08: identity information */
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smp_build_id_addr_cmd, /* 0x09: identity address information */
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smp_build_signing_info_cmd, /* 0x0A: signing information */
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smp_build_security_request, /* 0x0B: security request */
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smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */
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smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd, /* 0x0D: pairing DHKey check */
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smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */
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smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */
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};
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static const UINT8 smp_association_table[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] = {
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/* display only */ /* Display Yes/No */ /* keyboard only */
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/* No Input/Output */ /* keyboard display */
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/* initiator */
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/* model = tbl[peer_io_caps][loc_io_caps] */
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/* Display Only */
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{ {
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY
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},
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/* Display Yes/No */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY
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},
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/* Keyboard only */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF
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},
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/* No Input No Output */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY
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},
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/* keyboard display */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF
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}
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},
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/* responder */
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/* model = tbl[loc_io_caps][peer_io_caps] */
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/* Display Only */
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{ {
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF
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},
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/* Display Yes/No */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF
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},
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/* keyboard only */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY
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},
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/* No Input No Output */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY
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},
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/* keyboard display */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF,
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SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY
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}
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}
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};
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static const UINT8 smp_association_table_sc[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] = {
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/* display only */ /* Display Yes/No */ /* keyboard only */
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/* No InputOutput */ /* keyboard display */
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/* initiator */
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/* model = tbl[peer_io_caps][loc_io_caps] */
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/* Display Only */
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{ {
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT
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},
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/* Display Yes/No */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP
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},
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/* keyboard only */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP
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},
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/* No Input No Output */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS
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},
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/* keyboard display */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP
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}
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},
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/* responder */
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/* model = tbl[loc_io_caps][peer_io_caps] */
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/* Display Only */
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{ {
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP
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},
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/* Display Yes/No */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP
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},
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/* keyboard only */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT
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},
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/* No Input No Output */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS
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},
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/* keyboard display */
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{
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP,
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SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP
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}
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}
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};
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static tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_legacy_association_model(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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static tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(tSMP_CB *p_cb);
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/*******************************************************************************
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**
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** Function smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP
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**
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** Description Send message to L2CAP.
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**
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*******************************************************************************/
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BOOLEAN smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(BD_ADDR rem_bda, BT_HDR *p_toL2CAP)
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{
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UINT16 l2cap_ret;
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UINT16 fixed_cid = L2CAP_SMP_CID;
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if (smp_cb.smp_over_br) {
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fixed_cid = L2CAP_SMP_BR_CID;
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}
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SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
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smp_cb.total_tx_unacked += 1;
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if ((l2cap_ret = L2CA_SendFixedChnlData (fixed_cid, rem_bda, p_toL2CAP)) == L2CAP_DW_FAILED) {
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smp_cb.total_tx_unacked -= 1;
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SMP_TRACE_ERROR("SMP failed to pass msg:0x%0x to L2CAP",
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*((UINT8 *)(p_toL2CAP + 1) + p_toL2CAP->offset));
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return FALSE;
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} else {
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return TRUE;
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}
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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**
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** Function smp_send_cmd
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**
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** Description send a SMP command on L2CAP channel.
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**
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*******************************************************************************/
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BOOLEAN smp_send_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
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{
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BT_HDR *p_buf;
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BOOLEAN sent = FALSE;
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UINT8 failure = SMP_PAIR_INTERNAL_ERR;
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SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_send_cmd on l2cap cmd_code=0x%x\n", cmd_code);
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if ( cmd_code <= (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */) &&
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smp_cmd_build_act[cmd_code] != NULL) {
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p_buf = (*smp_cmd_build_act[cmd_code])(cmd_code, p_cb);
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if (p_buf != NULL &&
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smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(p_cb->pairing_bda, p_buf)) {
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sent = TRUE;
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btu_stop_timer (&p_cb->rsp_timer_ent);
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btu_start_timer (&p_cb->rsp_timer_ent, BTU_TTYPE_SMP_PAIRING_CMD,
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SMP_WAIT_FOR_RSP_TOUT);
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}
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}
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if (!sent) {
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if (p_cb->smp_over_br) {
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smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &failure);
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} else {
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smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &failure);
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}
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}
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return sent;
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}
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|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_rsp_timeout
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Called when SMP wait for SMP command response timer expires
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_rsp_timeout(TIMER_LIST_ENT *p_tle)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_CB *p_cb = &smp_cb;
|
|
UINT8 failure = SMP_RSP_TIMEOUT;
|
|
UNUSED(p_tle);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s state:%d br_state:%d", __FUNCTION__, p_cb->state, p_cb->br_state);
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->smp_over_br) {
|
|
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &failure);
|
|
} else {
|
|
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &failure);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_pairing_req_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build pairing request command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_build_pairing_cmd");
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, cmd_code);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->local_io_capability);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->loc_oob_flag);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->loc_auth_req);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->local_i_key);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->local_r_key);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
/* 1B ERR_RSP op code + 1B cmd_op_code + 2B handle + 1B status */
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_confirm_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build confirm request command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_confirm_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_build_confirm_cmd\n");
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->confirm, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_rand_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build Random command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_rand_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET))
|
|
!= NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_RAND);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->rand, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build security information command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd\n");
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_ENCRYPT_INFO);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_master_id_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build security information command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_master_id_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_MASTER_ID);
|
|
UINT16_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->ediv);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->enc_rand, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_MASTER_ID_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_identity_info_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build identity information command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_identity_info_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
BT_OCTET16 irk;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
UNUSED(p_cb);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_build_identity_info_cmd\n");
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
BTM_GetDeviceIDRoot(irk);
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_IDENTITY_INFO);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, irk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_id_addr_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build identity address information command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_id_addr_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
UNUSED(p_cb);
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_build_id_addr_cmd\n");
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_ID_ADDR);
|
|
/* Identity Address Information is used in the Transport Specific Key Distribution phase to distribute
|
|
its public device address or static random address. if slave using static random address is encrypted,
|
|
it should distribute its static random address */
|
|
if(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM && memcmp(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr,6) == 0) {
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, 0x01);
|
|
BDADDR_TO_STREAM (p, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
|
|
} else {
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, 0);
|
|
BDADDR_TO_STREAM (p, controller_get_interface()->get_address()->address);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_signing_info_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build signing information command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_signing_info_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_build_signing_info_cmd\n");
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_SIGN_INFO);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->csrk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_pairing_fail
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build Pairing Fail command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_fail(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->failure);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_security_request
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build security request command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_security_request(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + 2 + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->loc_auth_req);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("opcode=%d auth_req=0x%x", SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ, p_cb->loc_auth_req );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build pairing public key command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UINT8 publ_key[2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN];
|
|
UINT8 *p_publ_key = publ_key;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p_publ_key, p_cb->loc_publ_key.x, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(p_publ_key + BT_OCTET32_LEN, p_cb->loc_publ_key.y, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) +
|
|
SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_publ_key, 2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build pairing commitment command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET))
|
|
!= NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->commitment, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build pairing DHKey check command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) +
|
|
SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
|
ARRAY_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->dhkey_check, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Build keypress notification command.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
static BT_HDR *smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd(UINT8 cmd_code, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf = NULL ;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
UNUSED(cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR)\
|
|
+ SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, p_cb->local_keypress_notification);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_convert_string_to_tk
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to convert a 6 to 16 digits numeric
|
|
** character string into SMP TK.
|
|
**
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_convert_string_to_tk(BT_OCTET16 tk, UINT32 passkey)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 *p = tk;
|
|
tSMP_KEY key;
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_convert_string_to_tk\n");
|
|
UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, passkey);
|
|
|
|
key.key_type = SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK;
|
|
key.p_data = tk;
|
|
|
|
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_KEY_READY_EVT, &key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_mask_enc_key
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to mask off the encryption key based
|
|
** on the maximum encryption key size.
|
|
**
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_mask_enc_key(UINT8 loc_enc_size, UINT8 *p_data)
|
|
{
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_mask_enc_key\n");
|
|
if (loc_enc_size < BT_OCTET16_LEN) {
|
|
for (; loc_enc_size < BT_OCTET16_LEN; loc_enc_size ++) {
|
|
* (p_data + loc_enc_size) = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_xor_128
|
|
**
|
|
** Description utility function to do an biteise exclusive-OR of two bit
|
|
** strings of the length of BT_OCTET16_LEN.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_xor_128(BT_OCTET16 a, BT_OCTET16 b)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 i, *aa = a, *bb = b;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_xor_128\n");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < BT_OCTET16_LEN; i++) {
|
|
aa[i] = aa[i] ^ bb[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_cb_cleanup
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Clean up SMP control block
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_cb_cleanup(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_CALLBACK *p_callback = p_cb->p_callback;
|
|
UINT8 trace_level = p_cb->trace_level;
|
|
UINT32 static_passkey = p_cb->static_passkey;
|
|
BOOLEAN use_static_passkey = p_cb->use_static_passkey;
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_cb_cleanup\n");
|
|
|
|
memset(p_cb, 0, sizeof(tSMP_CB));
|
|
p_cb->p_callback = p_callback;
|
|
p_cb->trace_level = trace_level;
|
|
if(use_static_passkey) {
|
|
p_cb->use_static_passkey = use_static_passkey;
|
|
p_cb->static_passkey = static_passkey;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_remove_fixed_channel
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to remove the fixed channel
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_remove_fixed_channel(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->smp_over_br) {
|
|
L2CA_RemoveFixedChnl (L2CAP_SMP_BR_CID, p_cb->pairing_bda);
|
|
} else {
|
|
L2CA_RemoveFixedChnl (L2CAP_SMP_CID, p_cb->pairing_bda);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_reset_control_value
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to reset the control block value when
|
|
** pairing procedure finished.
|
|
**
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_reset_control_value(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_reset_control_value\n");
|
|
btu_stop_timer (&p_cb->rsp_timer_ent);
|
|
p_cb->flags = 0;
|
|
/* set the link idle timer to drop the link when pairing is done
|
|
usually service discovery will follow authentication complete, to avoid
|
|
racing condition for a link down/up, set link idle timer to be
|
|
SMP_LINK_TOUT_MIN to guarantee SMP key exchange */
|
|
L2CA_SetIdleTimeoutByBdAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, SMP_LINK_TOUT_MIN, BT_TRANSPORT_LE);
|
|
|
|
/* We can tell L2CAP to remove the fixed channel (if it has one) */
|
|
smp_remove_fixed_channel(p_cb);
|
|
smp_cb_cleanup(p_cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_proc_pairing_cmpl
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to process pairing complete
|
|
**
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_EVT_DATA evt_data = {0};
|
|
tSMP_CALLBACK *p_callback = p_cb->p_callback;
|
|
BD_ADDR pairing_bda;
|
|
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG ("smp_proc_pairing_cmpl \n");
|
|
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.reason = p_cb->status;
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.smp_over_br = p_cb->smp_over_br;
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.auth_mode = 0;
|
|
if (p_cb->status == SMP_SUCCESS) {
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
|
|
if (p_cb->auth_mode) { // the first encryption
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.auth_mode = p_cb->auth_mode;
|
|
if (p_rec) {
|
|
p_rec->ble.auth_mode = p_cb->auth_mode;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (p_rec) {
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.auth_mode = p_rec->ble.auth_mode;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.is_pair_cancel = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->is_pair_cancel) {
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.is_pair_cancel = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG ("send SMP_COMPLT_EVT reason=0x%0x sec_level=0x%0x\n",
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.reason,
|
|
evt_data.cmplt.sec_level );
|
|
|
|
memcpy (pairing_bda, p_cb->pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN);
|
|
|
|
#if (SMP_SLAVE_CON_PARAMS_UPD_ENABLE == TRUE)
|
|
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) {
|
|
if(p_rec && p_rec->ble.skip_update_conn_param) {
|
|
//clear flag
|
|
p_rec->ble.skip_update_conn_param = false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
smp_reset_control_value(p_cb);
|
|
|
|
if (p_callback) {
|
|
(*p_callback) (SMP_COMPLT_EVT, pairing_bda, &evt_data);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_command_has_invalid_parameters
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Checks if the received SMP command has invalid parameters i.e.
|
|
** if the command length is valid and the command parameters are
|
|
** inside specified range.
|
|
** It returns TRUE if the command has invalid parameters.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns TRUE if the command has invalid parameters, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x\n", __func__, cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
if ((cmd_code > (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */)) ||
|
|
(cmd_code < SMP_OPCODE_MIN)) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Somehow received command with the RESERVED code 0x%02x\n", cmd_code);
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(*smp_cmd_len_is_valid[cmd_code])(p_cb)) {
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(*smp_cmd_param_ranges_are_valid[cmd_code])(p_cb)) {
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Checks if the received command size is equal to the size
|
|
** according to specs.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns TRUE if the command size is as expected, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
**
|
|
** Note The command is expected to have fixed length.
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x\n", __func__, cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len != smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with invalid length\
|
|
0x%02x (per spec the length is 0x%02x).\n",
|
|
cmd_code, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len, smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Validates parameter ranges in the received SMP command
|
|
** pairing request or pairing response.
|
|
** The parameters to validate:
|
|
** IO capability,
|
|
** OOB data flag,
|
|
** Bonding_flags in AuthReq
|
|
** Maximum encryption key size.
|
|
** Returns FALSE if at least one of these parameters is out of range.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 io_caps = p_cb->peer_io_caps;
|
|
UINT8 oob_flag = p_cb->peer_oob_flag;
|
|
UINT8 bond_flag = p_cb->peer_auth_req & 0x03; //0x03 is gen bond with appropriate mask
|
|
UINT8 enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x\n", __func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
if (io_caps >= BTM_IO_CAP_MAX) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with IO Capabilty \
|
|
value (0x%02x) out of range).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, io_caps);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!((oob_flag == SMP_OOB_NONE) || (oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT))) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with OOB data flag value \
|
|
(0x%02x) out of range).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, oob_flag);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!((bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_NO_BOND) || (bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_BOND))) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Bonding_Flags value (0x%02x)\
|
|
out of range).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, bond_flag);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* `bte_appl_cfg.ble_min_enc_key_size` will be `SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MIN` by
|
|
* default if not set explicitly */
|
|
#if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE)
|
|
if (enc_size < bte_appl_cfg.ble_min_key_size) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption \
|
|
Key value (0x%02x) less than minimum required key size).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, enc_size);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if (enc_size < SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MIN) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption \
|
|
Key value (0x%02x) less than minimum required key size).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, enc_size);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (enc_size > SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MAX) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption \
|
|
Key value (0x%02x) greater than supported by stack).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, enc_size);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Validates Notification Type parameter range in the received SMP command
|
|
** pairing keypress notification.
|
|
** Returns FALSE if this parameter is out of range.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tBTM_SP_KEY_TYPE keypress_notification = p_cb->peer_keypress_notification;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x\n", __func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code);
|
|
|
|
if (keypress_notification >= BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Pairing Keypress \
|
|
Notification value (0x%02x) out of range).\n",
|
|
p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, keypress_notification);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Always returns TRUE.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Always returns FALSE.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command
|
|
**
|
|
** Description send pairing failure to an unexpected pairing command during
|
|
** an active pairing process.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command(BD_ADDR bd_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_HDR *p_buf;
|
|
UINT8 *p;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG ("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
|
|
|
|
if ((p_buf = (BT_HDR *)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + \
|
|
SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET)) != NULL) {
|
|
p = (UINT8 *)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM (p, SMP_PAIR_NOT_SUPPORT);
|
|
|
|
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
|
|
p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(bd_addr, p_buf);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_select_association_model
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function selects association model to use for STK
|
|
** generation. Selection is based on both sides' io capability,
|
|
** oob data flag and authentication request.
|
|
**
|
|
** Note If Secure Connections Only mode is required locally then we
|
|
** come to this point only if both sides support Secure Connections
|
|
** mode, i.e. if p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = TRUE then we come
|
|
** to this point only if
|
|
** (p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) ==
|
|
** (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) ==
|
|
** SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE;
|
|
p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_io_caps = %d p_cb->local_io_capability = %d\n",
|
|
__FUNCTION__, p_cb->peer_io_caps, p_cb->local_io_capability);
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_oob_flag = %d p_cb->loc_oob_flag = %d\n",
|
|
__FUNCTION__, p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p_cb->loc_oob_flag);
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_auth_req = 0x%02x p_cb->loc_auth_req = 0x%02x\n",
|
|
__FUNCTION__, p_cb->peer_auth_req, p_cb->loc_auth_req);
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = %s\n",
|
|
__FUNCTION__, p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required ?
|
|
"TRUE" : "FALSE");
|
|
|
|
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)) {
|
|
p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("use_sc_process = %d\n", p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used);
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) {
|
|
model = smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(p_cb);
|
|
} else {
|
|
model = smp_select_legacy_association_model(p_cb);
|
|
}
|
|
return model;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_select_legacy_association_model
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to select association mode if at least
|
|
** one side doesn't support secure connections.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_legacy_association_model(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
/* if OOB data is present on both devices, then use OOB association model */
|
|
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
|
|
return SMP_MODEL_OOB;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* else if neither device requires MITM, then use Just Works association model */
|
|
if (SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED (p_cb->peer_auth_req) && SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->loc_auth_req)) {
|
|
return SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* otherwise use IO capability to select association model */
|
|
if (p_cb->peer_io_caps < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX && p_cb->local_io_capability < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX) {
|
|
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
|
|
model = smp_association_table[p_cb->role][p_cb->peer_io_caps]
|
|
[p_cb->local_io_capability];
|
|
} else {
|
|
model = smp_association_table[p_cb->role][p_cb->local_io_capability]
|
|
[p_cb->peer_io_caps];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return model;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_select_association_model_secure_connections
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function is called to select association mode if both
|
|
** sides support secure connections.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
/* if OOB data is present on at least one device, then use OOB association model */
|
|
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT || p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
|
|
return SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* else if neither device requires MITM, then use Just Works association model */
|
|
if (SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED (p_cb->peer_auth_req) && SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->loc_auth_req)) {
|
|
return SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* otherwise use IO capability to select association model */
|
|
if (p_cb->peer_io_caps < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX && p_cb->local_io_capability < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX) {
|
|
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
|
|
model = smp_association_table_sc[p_cb->role][p_cb->peer_io_caps]
|
|
[p_cb->local_io_capability];
|
|
} else {
|
|
model = smp_association_table_sc[p_cb->role][p_cb->local_io_capability]
|
|
[p_cb->peer_io_caps];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return model;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_reverse_array
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function reverses array bytes
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_reverse_array(UINT8 *arr, UINT8 len)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 i = 0, tmp;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("smp_reverse_array\n");
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len / 2; i ++) {
|
|
tmp = arr[i];
|
|
arr[i] = arr[len - 1 - i];
|
|
arr[len - 1 - i] = tmp;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_calculate_random_input
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function returns random input value to be used in commitment
|
|
** calculation for SC passkey entry association mode
|
|
** (if bit["round"] in "random" array == 1 then returns 0x81
|
|
** else returns 0x80).
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns ri value
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
UINT8 smp_calculate_random_input(UINT8 *random, UINT8 round)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 i = round / 8;
|
|
UINT8 j = round % 8;
|
|
UINT8 ri;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("random: 0x%02x, round: %d, i: %d, j: %d\n", random[i], round, i, j);
|
|
ri = ((random[i] >> j) & 1) | 0x80;
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s ri=0x%02x\n", __func__, ri);
|
|
return ri;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_collect_local_io_capabilities
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function puts into IOcap array local device
|
|
** IOCapability, OOB data, AuthReq.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_collect_local_io_capabilities(UINT8 *iocap, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
iocap[0] = p_cb->local_io_capability;
|
|
iocap[1] = p_cb->loc_oob_flag;
|
|
iocap[2] = p_cb->loc_auth_req;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_collect_peer_io_capabilities
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function puts into IOcap array peer device
|
|
** IOCapability, OOB data, AuthReq.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_collect_peer_io_capabilities(UINT8 *iocap, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
iocap[0] = p_cb->peer_io_caps;
|
|
iocap[1] = p_cb->peer_oob_flag;
|
|
iocap[2] = p_cb->peer_auth_req;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_collect_local_ble_address
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function puts into le_addr array local device le address:
|
|
** le_addr[0-5] = local BD ADDR,
|
|
** le_addr[6] = local le address type (PUBLIC/RANDOM).
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_collect_local_ble_address(UINT8 *le_addr, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type = 0;
|
|
BD_ADDR bda;
|
|
UINT8 *p = le_addr;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
BTM_ReadConnectionAddr( p_cb->pairing_bda, bda, &addr_type);
|
|
BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, bda);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, addr_type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_collect_peer_ble_address
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function puts into le_addr array peer device le address:
|
|
** le_addr[0-5] = peer BD ADDR,
|
|
** le_addr[6] = peer le address type (PUBLIC/RANDOM).
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_collect_peer_ble_address(UINT8 *le_addr, tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type = 0;
|
|
BD_ADDR bda;
|
|
UINT8 *p = le_addr;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
if (!BTM_ReadRemoteConnectionAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, bda, &addr_type)) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("can not collect peer le addr information for unknown device\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, bda);
|
|
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, addr_type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
** Function smp_check_commitment
|
|
**
|
|
** Description This function compares peer commitment values:
|
|
** - expected (i.e. calculated locally),
|
|
** - received from the peer.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns TRUE if the values are the same
|
|
** FALSE otherwise
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_check_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
BT_OCTET16 expected;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
smp_calculate_peer_commitment(p_cb, expected);
|
|
print128(expected, (const UINT8 *)"calculated peer commitment");
|
|
print128(p_cb->remote_commitment, (const UINT8 *)"received peer commitment");
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(p_cb->remote_commitment, expected, BT_OCTET16_LEN)) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Commitment check fails\n");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Commitment check succeeds\n");
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key
|
|
**
|
|
** Description The function saves SC LTK as BLE key for future use as local
|
|
** and/or peer key.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns void
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
void smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tBTM_LE_LENC_KEYS lle_key;
|
|
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS ple_key;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-Save LTK as local LTK key\n", __func__);
|
|
memcpy(lle_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
lle_key.div = 0;
|
|
lle_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
|
|
lle_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
|
|
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LENC, (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&lle_key, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-Save LTK as peer LTK key\n", __func__);
|
|
ple_key.ediv = 0;
|
|
memset(ple_key.rand, 0, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(ple_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
|
|
ple_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
|
|
ple_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
|
|
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC, (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&ple_key, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_calculate_f5_mackey_and_long_term_key
|
|
**
|
|
** Description The function calculates MacKey and LTK and saves them in CB.
|
|
** To calculate MacKey and LTK it calls smp_calc_f5(...).
|
|
** MacKey is used in dhkey calculation, LTK is used to encrypt
|
|
** the link.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns FALSE if out of resources, TRUE otherwise.
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_calculate_f5_mackey_and_long_term_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 a[7];
|
|
UINT8 b[7];
|
|
UINT8 *p_na;
|
|
UINT8 *p_nb;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
|
|
smp_collect_local_ble_address(a, p_cb);
|
|
smp_collect_peer_ble_address(b, p_cb);
|
|
p_na = p_cb->rand;
|
|
p_nb = p_cb->rrand;
|
|
} else {
|
|
smp_collect_local_ble_address(b, p_cb);
|
|
smp_collect_peer_ble_address(a, p_cb);
|
|
p_na = p_cb->rrand;
|
|
p_nb = p_cb->rand;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!smp_calculate_f5(p_cb->dhkey, p_na, p_nb, a, b, p_cb->mac_key, p_cb->ltk)) {
|
|
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failed\n", __func__);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("%s is completed\n", __func__);
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
** Function smp_request_oob_data
|
|
**
|
|
** Description Requests application to provide OOB data.
|
|
**
|
|
** Returns TRUE - OOB data has to be provided by application
|
|
** FALSE - otherwise (unexpected)
|
|
**
|
|
*******************************************************************************/
|
|
BOOLEAN smp_request_oob_data(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
tSMP_OOB_DATA_TYPE req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_INVALID_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
|
|
/* both local and peer rcvd data OOB */
|
|
req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_BOTH;
|
|
} else if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
|
|
/* peer rcvd OOB local data, local didn't receive OOB peer data */
|
|
req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_LOCAL;
|
|
} else if (p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) {
|
|
req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_PEER;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("req_oob_type = %d\n", req_oob_type);
|
|
|
|
if (req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_INVALID_TYPE) {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p_cb->req_oob_type = req_oob_type;
|
|
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SC_OOB_REQ_EVT;
|
|
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_TK_REQ_EVT, &req_oob_type);
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|