esp-idf/components/protocomm/include/crypto/srp6a/esp_srp.h
Vikram Dattu 8857082585
refactor(esp_srp): Expose esp_srp.h and add API docs
- Also added missing `protocomm_security2` reference in `protocomm.rst`
2023-11-23 12:01:10 +05:30

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
#pragma once
#include <stdint.h>
#include <esp_err.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* @brief SRP-6a protocol implementation
*
* More information on protocol can be found: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5054
*
* This implementation is used by security2 of wifi_provisioning and local control features.
* Details on how these protocols use this feature can be found here: https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/esp32c3/api-reference/provisioning/provisioning.html#security-2-scheme
*
* Below is the example usage of the srp6a protocol in protocomm component,
* which can help understand the APIs better.
*
* Variables used:
*
* N, g: group parameters (prime and generator)
* s: salt
* B, b: server's public and private values
* A, a: client's public and private values
* I: user name (aka "identity")
* P: password
* v: verifier
* k: SRP-6 multiplier
*
* salt (s) is random of given length, 16 in our case, which along with username and password
* is used to generate verifier.
*
* x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P))
* v = g^x % N
*
* Steps involved (From protocomm component usage):
* Step1. Client Hello (PhoneApp):
* a. Generate Key pair:
* a (cli_privkey) = 256 bit random value,
* A (cli_pubkey) = g^a.
* g - generator, N - large safe prime, All arithmetic operations are performed in ring of integers modulo N,
* thus all occurrences like y^z should be read as y^z modulo N.
* b. SessionCmd0 (cli_pubkey, username I)
*
* Step2. Device(ESP):
* a. Obtain Salt and verifier stored on ESP
* Salt s = 256 bit random value,
* Verifier v = g^× where x = H(s | I | P)
* b. Generate Key Pair
* b (dev_privkey) = 256 bit random value
* B(dev_pubkey) = k*v + g^b where k = H(N, g)
* c. Shared Key K = H(S) where,
* S = (A * v^u) ^ b
* u = H(A, B)
* d. SessionResp0(dev_pubkey B, dev_random)
*
* Step3. Client (PhoneApp)
* a. shared_key(K) = H(S) where,
* S = (B - k*v) ^ (a + ux),
* u = H(A, B),
* k = H(N, g),
* V = g^x,
* x = H(s | I | P).
* b. Verification token
* client proof M = H[H(N) XOR H(g) | H(I) | S | A | B | K]
* c. SessionCmd1(Client proof M1)
*
* Step4. Device (ESP):
* a. Verify client:
* device generates M1 = H[H(N) XOR H(g) | H(I) | S | A | B | K]
* device verifies this M1 with the M1 obtained from Client
* b. Verification token: Device generate device proof M2 = H(A, M, K)
* c. Initialization Vector(IV):
* dev_rand = gen_16byte_random) This random number is to be used for AES-GCM operation
* for encryption and decryption of the data using the shared secret
* d. SessionResp1 (DeviceProofM2, dev_rand)
*
* Step5. Client (PhoneApp)
* a. Verify Device
* Client calculates device proof M2 as M2 = H(A, M, K)
* verifies this M2 with M2 obtained from device
*/
/**
* @brief Large prime+generator to be used for the algorithm
*/
typedef enum {
/* SRP specific:
* N = 3072 bit large safe prime,
* g = generator */
ESP_NG_3072 = 0,
} esp_ng_type_t;
typedef struct esp_srp_handle esp_srp_handle_t;
/**
* @brief Initialize srp context for given NG type
*
* @param ng NG type given by `esp_ng_type_t`
* @return esp_srp_handle_t* srp handle
*
* @note the handle gets freed with `esp_srp_free`
*/
esp_srp_handle_t *esp_srp_init(esp_ng_type_t ng);
/**
* @brief free esp_srp_context
*
* @param hd handle to be free
*/
void esp_srp_free(esp_srp_handle_t *hd);
/**
* @brief Returns B (pub key) and salt. [Step2.b]
*
* @param hd esp_srp handle
* @param username Username not expected NULL terminated
* @param username_len Username length
* @param pass Password not expected to be NULL terminated
* @param pass_len Pasword length
* @param salt_len Salt length
* @param bytes_B Public Key returned
* @param len_B Length of the public key
* @param bytes_salt Salt bytes generated
* @return esp_err_t ESP_OK on success, appropriate error otherwise
*
* @note *bytes_B MUST NOT BE FREED BY THE CALLER
* @note *bytes_salt MUST NOT BE FREE BY THE CALLER
*/
esp_err_t esp_srp_srv_pubkey(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, const char *username, int username_len,
const char *pass, int pass_len, int salt_len,
char **bytes_B, int *len_B, char **bytes_salt);
/**
* @brief Set the Salt and Verifier pre-generated for a given password.
*
* This should be used only if the actual password is not available.
* The public key can then be generated using esp_srp_srv_pubkey_from_salt_verifier()
* and not esp_srp_srv_pubkey()
*
* @param hd esp_srp_handle
* @param salt pre-generated salt bytes
* @param salt_len length of the salt bytes
* @param verifier pre-generated verifier
* @param verifier_len length of the verifier bytes
* @return esp_err_t ESP_OK on success, appropriate error otherwise
*/
esp_err_t esp_srp_set_salt_verifier(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, const char *salt, int salt_len,
const char *verifier, int verifier_len);
/**
* @brief Returns B (pub key)[Step2.b] when the salt and verifier are set using esp_srp_set_salt_verifier()
*
* @param hd esp_srp handle
* @param bytes_B Key returned to the called
* @param len_B Length of the key returned
* @return esp_err_t ESP_OK on success, appropriate error otherwise
*
* @note *bytes_B MUST NOT BE FREED BY THE CALLER
*/
esp_err_t esp_srp_srv_pubkey_from_salt_verifier(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, char **bytes_B, int *len_B);
/**
* @brief Get session key in `*bytes_key` given by len in `*len_key`. [Step2.c].
*
* This calculated session key is used for further communication given the proofs are
* exchanged/authenticated with `esp_srp_exchange_proofs`
*
* @param hd esp_srp handle
* @param bytes_A Private Key
* @param len_A Private Key length
* @param bytes_key Key returned to the caller
* @param len_key length of the key in *bytes_key
* @return esp_err_t ESP_OK on success, appropriate error otherwise
*
* @note *bytes_key MUST NOT BE FREED BY THE CALLER
*/
esp_err_t esp_srp_get_session_key(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, char *bytes_A, int len_A, char **bytes_key, uint16_t *len_key);
/**
* @brief Complete the authentication. If this step fails, the session_key exchanged should not be used
*
* This is the final authentication step in SRP algorithm [Step4.1, Step4.b, Step4.c]
*
* @param hd esp_srp handle
* @param username Username not expected NULL terminated
* @param username_len Username length
* @param bytes_user_proof param in
* @param bytes_host_proof parameter out (should be SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) bytes in size
* @return esp_err_t ESP_OK if user's proof is ok and subsequently bytes_host_proof is populated with our own proof.
*/
esp_err_t esp_srp_exchange_proofs(esp_srp_handle_t *hd, char *username, uint16_t username_len,
char *bytes_user_proof, char *bytes_host_proof);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif