mirror of
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf.git
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a9fda54d39
This commit updates the visibility of various header files and cleans up some unnecessary inclusions. Also, this commit removes certain header include paths which were maintained for backward compatibility.
142 lines
5.2 KiB
C
142 lines
5.2 KiB
C
/*
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* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021-2022 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense OR CC0-1.0
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*/
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/*
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Tests for the BLE SMP implementation
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*/
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#include <esp_types.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <malloc.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
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#include "freertos/task.h"
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#include "freertos/semphr.h"
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#include "freertos/queue.h"
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#include "freertos/xtensa_api.h"
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#include "unity.h"
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#include "esp_heap_caps.h"
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#include "esp_log.h"
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#include "freertos/ringbuf.h"
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#include "esp_random.h"
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#include "nvs_flash.h"
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#include "esp_bt.h"
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#include "esp_bt_main.h"
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#include "esp_bt_device.h"
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#include "esp_gap_ble_api.h"
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#define TAG "ble_smp_test"
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#define KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256 8
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typedef unsigned long DWORD;
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typedef uint32_t UINT32;
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typedef struct {
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DWORD x[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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DWORD y[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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DWORD z[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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} Point;
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typedef struct {
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// curve's coefficients
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DWORD a[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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DWORD b[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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//whether a is -3
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int a_minus3;
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// prime modulus
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DWORD p[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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// Omega, p = 2^m -omega
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DWORD omega[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
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// base point, a point on E of order r
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Point G;
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} elliptic_curve_t;
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extern void ECC_PointMult_Bin_NAF(Point *q, Point *p, DWORD *n, uint32_t keyLength);
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extern bool ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(Point *p);
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extern void p_256_init_curve(UINT32 keyLength);
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extern elliptic_curve_t curve_p256;
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static void bt_rand(void *buf, size_t len)
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{
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if (!len) {
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return;
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}
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// Reset the buf value to the fixed value.
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memset(buf, 0x55, len);
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for (int i = 0; i < (int)(len / sizeof(uint32_t)); i++) {
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uint32_t rand = esp_random();
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memcpy(buf + i*sizeof(uint32_t), &rand, sizeof(uint32_t));
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}
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return;
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}
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TEST_CASE("ble_smp_public_key_check", "[ble_smp]")
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{
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/* We wait init finish 200ms here */
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vTaskDelay(200 / portTICK_PERIOD_MS);
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Point public_key;
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DWORD private_key[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256] = {[0 ... (KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256 - 1)] = 0x12345678};
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p_256_init_curve(KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
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ECC_PointMult_Bin_NAF(&public_key, &(curve_p256.G), private_key, KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
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/* Check Is the public key generated by the system on the given elliptic curve */
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TEST_ASSERT(ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&public_key));
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/* We simulate the attacker and set the y coordinate of the public key to 0. */
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for (int i = 0; i < KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256; i++) {
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public_key.y[i] = 0x0;
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}
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/* At this point the public key should not be on the given elliptic curve. */
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TEST_ASSERT(!ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&public_key));
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/* Test whether the G point on the protocol is on a given elliptic curve */
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TEST_ASSERT(ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&(curve_p256.G)));
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/* test 100 times when the private key is generated by the random number. */
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for (int j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
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bt_rand(private_key, sizeof(DWORD)*KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
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ECC_PointMult_Bin_NAF(&public_key, &(curve_p256.G), private_key, KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
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/* Check Is the public key generated by the system on the given elliptic curve */
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TEST_ASSERT(ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&public_key));
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}
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}
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TEST_CASE("ble_smp_set_clear_static_passkey", "[ble_smp]")
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{
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/* We wait init finish 200ms here */
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vTaskDelay(200 / portTICK_PERIOD_MS);
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esp_ble_auth_req_t auth_req = ESP_LE_AUTH_BOND;
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uint32_t passkey = 123456;
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/* test len = 0 when type != ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_AUTHEN_REQ_MODE, &auth_req, 0) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test function */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_AUTHEN_REQ_MODE, &auth_req, sizeof(esp_ble_auth_req_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test type >= ESP_BLE_SM_MAX_PARAM */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_MAX_PARAM, &passkey, sizeof(uint32_t)) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test len < sizeof(uint32_t) when type is ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, &passkey, sizeof(uint8_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test value is NULL when type != ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, sizeof(uint8_t)) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test value is NULL and len is 0 when type != ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, 0) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test function */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, &passkey, sizeof(uint32_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test function */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY, &passkey, sizeof(uint32_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test function */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, sizeof(uint32_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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/* test function */
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TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, 0) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
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}
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