/* * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020-2022 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD * * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 */ #pragma once #include #include #include "ets_sys.h" #include "rsa_pss.h" #include "ecdsa.h" #include "esp_assert.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t; typedef struct ets_secure_boot_signature ets_secure_boot_signature_t; typedef struct ets_secure_boot_key_digests ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t; /* Anti-FI measure: use full words for success/fail, instead of 0/non-zero */ typedef enum { SB_SUCCESS = 0x3A5A5AA5, SB_FAILED = 0x7533885E, } ets_secure_boot_status_t; /* Verify and stage-load the bootloader image (reconfigures cache to map, loads trusted key digests from efuse, copies the bootloader into the staging buffer.) If allow_key_revoke is true and aggressive revoke efuse is set, any failed signature has its associated key revoked in efuse. If result is SB_SUCCESS, the "simple hash" of the bootloader is copied into verified_hash. */ ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_stage_bootloader(uint8_t *verified_hash, bool allow_key_revoke); /* Verify bootloader image (reconfigures cache to map), with key digests provided as parameters.) Can be used to verify secure boot status before enabling secure boot permanently. If stage_load parameter is true, bootloader is copied into staging buffer in RAM at the same time. If result is SB_SUCCESS, the "simple hash" of the bootloader is copied into verified_hash. */ ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_bootloader_with_keys(uint8_t *verified_hash, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys, bool stage_load); /* Read key digests from efuse. Any revoked/missing digests will be marked as NULL */ ETS_STATUS ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys); /* Verify supplied signature against supplied digest, using supplied trusted key digests. Doesn't reconfigure cache or any other hardware access except for RSA peripheral. If result is SB_SUCCESS, the image_digest value is copied into verified_digest. */ ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig, const uint8_t *image_digest, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys, uint8_t *verified_digest); /* Revoke a public key digest in efuse. @param index Digest to revoke. Must be 0, 1 or 2. */ void ets_secure_boot_revoke_public_key_digest(int index); #define CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN 1196 #define SIG_BLOCK_PADDING 4096 #define ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC 0xE7 /* Secure Boot V2 signature block (extended to support ECDSA) (Up to 3 in a signature sector are appended to the image) */ struct __attribute((packed)) ets_secure_boot_sig_block { uint8_t magic_byte; uint8_t version; uint8_t _reserved1; uint8_t _reserved2; uint8_t image_digest[32]; struct { struct { uint8_t curve_id; /* ETS_ECDSA_CURVE_P192 / ETS_ECDSA_CURVE_P256 */ uint8_t point[64]; /* X followed by Y (both little-endian), plus zero bytes if P192 */ } key; uint8_t signature[64]; /* r followed by s (both little-endian) */ uint8_t padding[1031]; } ecdsa; uint32_t block_crc; /* note: crc covers all bytes in the structure before it, regardless of version field */ uint8_t _padding[16]; }; ESP_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t) == 1216, "invalid sig block size"); #define SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS 1 /* V2 Secure boot signature sector (up to 3 blocks) */ struct ets_secure_boot_signature { ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t block[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS]; uint8_t _padding[4096 - (sizeof(ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t) * SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS)]; }; ESP_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t) == 4096, "invalid sig sector size"); #define MAX_KEY_DIGESTS 1 struct ets_secure_boot_key_digests { const void *key_digests[MAX_KEY_DIGESTS]; bool allow_key_revoke; }; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif