// Copyright 2020 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. #ifndef _ROM_SECURE_BOOT_H_ #define _ROM_SECURE_BOOT_H_ #include #include "rsa_pss.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block; struct ets_secure_boot_signature_t; typedef struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t; typedef struct ets_secure_boot_signature ets_secure_boot_signature_t; typedef struct ets_secure_boot_key_digests ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t; /* Anti-FI measure: use full words for success/fail, instead of 0/non-zero */ typedef enum { SB_SUCCESS = 0x3A5A5AA5, SB_FAILED = 0x7533885E, } ets_secure_boot_status_t; /* Verify and stage-load the bootloader image (reconfigures cache to map, loads trusted key digests from efuse, copies the bootloader into the staging buffer.) If allow_key_revoke is true and aggressive revoke efuse is set, any failed signature has its associated key revoked in efuse. If result is SB_SUCCESS, the "simple hash" of the bootloader is copied into verified_hash. */ ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_stage_bootloader(uint8_t *verified_hash, bool allow_key_revoke); /* Verify bootloader image (reconfigures cache to map), with key digests provided as parameters.) Can be used to verify secure boot status before enabling secure boot permanently. If stage_load parameter is true, bootloader is copied into staging buffer in RAM at the same time. If result is SB_SUCCESS, the "simple hash" of the bootloader is copied into verified_hash. */ ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_bootloader_with_keys(uint8_t *verified_hash, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys, bool stage_load); /* Read key digests from efuse. Any revoked/missing digests will be marked as NULL */ ETS_STATUS ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys); /* Verify supplied signature against supplied digest, using supplied trusted key digests. Doesn't reconfigure cache or any other hardware access except for RSA peripheral. If result is SB_SUCCESS, the image_digest value is copied into verified_digest. */ ets_secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig, const uint8_t *image_digest, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys, uint8_t *verified_digest); /* Revoke a public key digest in efuse. @param index Digest to revoke. Must be 0, 1 or 2. */ void ets_secure_boot_revoke_public_key_digest(int index); #define ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC 0xE7 /* Secure Boot V2 signature block (Up to 3 in a signature sector are appended to the image) */ struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block { uint8_t magic_byte; uint8_t version; uint8_t _reserved1; uint8_t _reserved2; uint8_t image_digest[32]; ets_rsa_pubkey_t key; uint8_t signature[384]; uint32_t block_crc; uint8_t _padding[16]; }; _Static_assert(sizeof(ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t) == 1216, "invalid sig block size"); #define SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS 3 /* V2 Secure boot signature sector (up to 3 blocks) */ struct ets_secure_boot_signature { ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t block[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS]; uint8_t _padding[4096 - (sizeof(ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t) * SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS)]; }; _Static_assert(sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t) == 4096, "invalid sig sector size"); #define MAX_KEY_DIGESTS 3 struct ets_secure_boot_key_digests { const void *key_digests[MAX_KEY_DIGESTS]; bool allow_key_revoke; }; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* _ROM_SECURE_BOOT_H_ */