Avoid dereferencing a dangling function pointer in 'eap_server_sm_deinit()'.
This issue arises when hostap unregisteres EAP methods before it removes
the server state machine for station.
The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
configuration parameter option:
'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
* 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
* 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
(private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
not used (default)
* 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
1) Add parameter to configure reason code of deauth frame
2) Add logs to indicate MIC failure 4-Way-Handshake
3) Process RSNXE capabilities only if AP advertises them
SAE: Derive a variable length PMK with the new AKM suites
Select the PMK length based on the used group (prime length) when using
the new AKM suites for SAE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
SAE: Indicate AKM suite selector in commit for new AKM suites
SAE authentication needs to known which AKM suite is being used to be
able to determine the correct PMK length for the new AKM suite selectors
that use variable length keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
SAE: EAPOL-Key and key/MIC length information for the new AKM suites
Update the AKM suite specific mapping of various EAPOL-Key key lengths
and algorithms to include the new SAE AKM suites with variable length
keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
SAE: Internal WPA_KEY_MGMT_* defines for extended key AKMs
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Define new RSN AKM suite selector values
Add the new AKM suite selectors defined in IEEE P802.11-REVme/D1.3.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
-Merges the addition of extended caps IE for assoc req, probe resp
and beacons in a single place. This ensures that there are no
duplicate Extended Caps IE in the frame. Moves the capability
indication for BTM and HT20/40 from supplicant to wifi libs.
-Fix issue with frequent disconections when scanning for only a single
channel.
-Prints error message and returns ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED in case
esp32c2 tries to set bandwidth to HT40.
Fix crash in sending new RRM neighbour report requests by removing
the call to neighbour report request timeout callback in case of
already ongoing neighbour report request timer.
1) Ignore immediate assoc req received from the station while we are
processing the older one
2) Create station mutex (sta->lock) only for stations connecting with wpa3
security
3) Fix regression caused by 4cb4faa9
