When registrar somehow misses the WSC_DONE sent by station and station
goes for next connection after sending deauth, make sure that softAP
disables the registrar.
- Ensure that wpa_supplicant's state machine registers the requirement for rsnxe
before deciding to add rsnxe to a assoc request.
Co-authored-by: jgujarathi <jash.gujarathi@espressif.com>
1. Free temporary data used by SAE before memsetting the same
2. Drop any received auth response that uses a different algorithm than the one currently in use
* Fix issues related to mgmt packets encryption in GCMP
* Fix issue of wrong decryption of mgmt packets when PMF is enabled
* Fix softAP bug in handling of SAE Reauthentication
1. Add support for SAE-PK and WPA3-Enterprise transition disable
2. Add support to handle OWE transition disable indication from AP
2. Update Wi-Fi WPA3 authmodes as per WPA Specification v3.3:
- Merge 'WIFI_AUTH_WPA3_EXT_PSK' and 'WIFI_AUTH_WPA3_EXT_PSK_MIXED_MODE'
into 'WIFI_AUTH_WPA3_PSK' as per specification.
4. refactor: Backport common changes in scan/connect path from 90cc6158
- 90cc6158 adds support for Network Introduction Protocl in DPP
Make sure that WPS registrar public APIs do not modify supplicant
data in application task context. Execute API functionlity in eloop
context to prevent protential race conditions.
Avoid dereferencing a dangling function pointer in 'eap_server_sm_deinit()'.
This issue arises when hostap unregisteres EAP methods before it removes
the server state machine for station.
The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
configuration parameter option:
'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
* 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
* 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
(private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
not used (default)
* 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
1) Add parameter to configure reason code of deauth frame
2) Add logs to indicate MIC failure 4-Way-Handshake
3) Process RSNXE capabilities only if AP advertises them
