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Merge branch 'bugfix/fix_condition_to_verify_when_no_SB_v5.1' into 'release/v5.1'

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fix(bootloader_support): Fix condition for checking signature in the application (v5.1)

See merge request espressif/esp-idf!26225
This commit is contained in:
Mahavir Jain 2023-09-27 17:20:50 +08:00
commit fd7f8ee8f9
2 changed files with 7 additions and 9 deletions
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4
components/bootloader/Kconfig.projbuild
View File

@ -704,14 +704,12 @@ menu "Security features"
config SECURE_BOOT_VERIFICATION_KEY
string "Secure boot public signature verification key"
depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS && !SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES && !SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS && SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME && !SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES
default "signature_verification_key.bin"
help
Path to a public key file used to verify signed images.
Secure Boot V1: This ECDSA public key is compiled into the bootloader and/or
app, to verify app images.
Secure Boot V2: This RSA public key is compiled into the signature block at
the end of the bootloader/app.
Key file is in raw binary format, and can be extracted from a
PEM formatted private key using the espsecure.py

12
components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot.c
View File

@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ static esp_err_t secure_boot_v2_check(bool *need_fix)
#endif
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT
#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
#if (CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME) && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
static void rsa_check_signature_on_update_check(void)
static void check_signature_on_update_check(void)
{
// We rely on the keys used to sign this app to verify the next app on OTA, so make sure there is at
// least one to avoid a stuck firmware
@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static void rsa_check_signature_on_update_check(void)
}
#endif
}
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
#endif // (CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME) && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
void esp_secure_boot_init_checks(void)
{
@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ void esp_secure_boot_init_checks(void)
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT
#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
rsa_check_signature_on_update_check();
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
#if (CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME) && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
check_signature_on_update_check();
#endif // (CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME) && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
}