mbedtls: Add bounds check before signature length read

Part of the patch for CVE-2018-9988.
Cherry-picked from a1098f81c2
Ref. https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/issues/1860
This commit is contained in:
Ivan Grokhotkov 2018-04-19 11:48:31 +08:00
parent b42ba1b0a5
commit f58c664e2b

View File

@ -2470,6 +2470,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Read signature
*/
if( p > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;