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Docs: add CN translation for api-reference/provisioning/provisioning.rst (backport v5.1)
This commit is contained in:
Cai Xin Ying
Krzysztof Budzynski
parent
cbce221e88
commit
deca1e79ba
@ -26,8 +26,11 @@ Protocomm provides framework for various transports :
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Note that the client still needs to establish session (for protocomm_security1 and protocomm_security2) by performing the two way handshake. See :doc:`provisioning` for more details about the secure handshake logic.
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.. _enabling-protocomm-security-version:
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Enabling protocomm security version
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-----------------------------------
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Protocomm component provides project configuration menu to enable/disable support of respective security versions.
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The respective configuration options can be found as follows:
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@ -3,17 +3,32 @@
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Unified Provisioning
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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:link_to_translation:`zh_CN:[中文]`
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Overview
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>>>>>>>>
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Unified provisioning support in the ESP-IDF provides an extensible mechanism to the developers to configure the device with the Wi-Fi credentials and/or other custom configuration using various transports and different security schemes. Depending on the use-case it provides a complete and ready solution for Wi-Fi network provisioning along with example iOS and Android applications. Or developers can extend the device-side and phone-app side implementations to accommodate their requirements for sending additional configuration data. Following are the important features of this implementation.
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1. *Extensible Protocol:* The protocol is completely flexible and it offers the ability for the developers to send custom configuration in the provisioning process. The data representation too is left to the application to decide.
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2. *Transport Flexibility:* The protocol can work on Wi-Fi (SoftAP + HTTP server) or on BLE as a transport protocol. The framework provides an ability to add support for any other transport easily as long as command-response behaviour can be supported on the transport.
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3. *Security Scheme Flexibility:* It's understood that each use-case may require different security scheme to secure the data that is exchanged in the provisioning process. Some applications may work with SoftAP that's WPA2 protected or BLE with "just-works" security. Or the applications may consider the transport to be insecure and may want application level security. The unified provisioning framework allows application to choose the security as deemed suitable.
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4. *Compact Data Representation:* The protocol uses `Google Protobufs <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/>`_ as a data representation for session setup and Wi-Fi provisioning. They provide a compact data representation and ability to parse the data in multiple programming languages in native format. Please note that this data representation is not forced on application specific data and the developers may choose the representation of their choice.
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The unified provisioning support in the ESP-IDF provides an extensible mechanism to the developers to configure the device with the Wi-Fi credentials and/or other custom configuration using various transports and different security schemes. Depending on the use case, it provides a complete and ready solution for Wi-Fi network provisioning along with example iOS and Android applications. The developers can choose to extend the device-side and phone-app side implementations to accommodate their requirements for sending additional configuration data. The followings are the important features of this implementation:
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1. **Extensible Protocol**
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The protocol is completely flexible and it offers the ability for the developers to send custom configuration in the provisioning process. The data representation is also left to the application to decide.
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2. **Transport Flexibility**
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The protocol can work on Wi-Fi (SoftAP + HTTP server) or on Bluetooth LE as a transport protocol. The framework provides an ability to add support for any other transport easily as long as command-response behavior can be supported on the transport.
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3. **Security Scheme Flexibility**
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It is understood that each use case may require different security scheme to secure the data that is exchanged in the provisioning process. Some applications may work with SoftAP that is WPA2 protected or Bluetooth LE with the "just-works" security. Or the applications may consider the transport to be insecure and may want application-level security. The unified provisioning framework allows the application to choose the security as deemed suitable.
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4. **Compact Data Representation**
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The protocol uses `Google Protobufs <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/>`_ as a data representation for session setup and Wi-Fi provisioning. They provide a compact data representation and ability to parse the data in multiple programming languages in native format. Please note that this data representation is not forced on application-specific data and the developers may choose the representation of their choice.
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Typical Provisioning Process
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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.. seqdiag::
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:caption: Typical Provisioning Process
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:align: center
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@ -30,7 +45,7 @@ Typical Provisioning Process
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CLIENT [label = "Client"];
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DEVICE [label = "Device"];
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=== 1. Transport specific discovery and connection ===
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=== 1. Transport-specific discovery and connection ===
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DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="Some form of beaconing"];
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CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="Client connects"];
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=== 2. Session Establishment ====
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@ -42,7 +57,7 @@ Typical Provisioning Process
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... One or multiple steps as per protocol ...
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DEVICE --> CLIENT
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=== 3. Configuration ===
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CLIENT --> DEVICE [label="App specific Set Config (optional)"];
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CLIENT --> DEVICE [label="App-specific Set Config (optional)"];
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DEVICE --> CLIENT [label="Set Config Response (optional)"];
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CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="Wi-Fi SetConfig(SSID, Passphrase...)"];
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DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="Wi-Fi SetConfig response"];
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@ -56,38 +71,53 @@ Typical Provisioning Process
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Deciding on Transport
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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Unified provisioning subsystem supports Wi-Fi (SoftAP+HTTP server) and BLE (GATT based) transport schemes. Following points need to be considered while selecting the best possible transport for provisioning.
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1. BLE based transport has an advantage that in the provisioning process, the BLE communication channel stays intact between the device and the client. That provides reliable provisioning feedback.
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2. BLE based provisioning implementation makes the user-experience better from the phone apps as on Android and iOS both, the phone app can discover and connect to the device without requiring user to go out of the phone app
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3. BLE transport however consumes ~110KB memory at runtime. If the product does not use the BLE or BT functionality after provisioning is done, almost all the memory can be reclaimed back and can be added into the heap.
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4. SoftAP based transport is highly interoperable; however as the same radio is shared between SoftAP and Station interface, the transport is not reliable in the phase when the Wi-Fi connection to external AP is attempted. Also, the client may roam back to different network when the SoftAP changes the channel at the time of Station connection.
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5. SoftAP transport does not require much additional memory for the Wi-Fi use-cases
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6. SoftAP based provisioning requires the phone app user to go to "System Settings" to connect to Wi-Fi network hosted by the device in case of iOS. The discovery (scanning) as well as connection API is not available for the iOS applications.
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The unified provisioning subsystem supports Wi-Fi (SoftAP+HTTP server) and Bluetooth LE (GATT based) transport schemes. The following points need to be considered while selecting the best possible transport for provisioning:
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1. The Bluetooth LE-based transport has the advantage of maintaining an intact communication channel between the device and the client during the provisioning, which ensures reliable provisioning feedback.
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2. The Bluetooth LE-based provisioning implementation makes the user experience better from the phone apps as on Android and iOS both, the phone app can discover and connect to the device without requiring the user to go out of the phone app.
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3. However, the Bluetooth LE transport consumes about 110 KB memory at runtime. If the product does not use the Bluetooth LE or Bluetooth functionality after provisioning is done, almost all the memory can be reclaimed and added into the heap.
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4. The SoftAP-based transport is highly interoperable. However, there are a few considerations:
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- The device uses the same radio to host the SoftAP and also to connect to the configured AP. Since these could potentially be on different channels, it may cause connection status updates not to be reliably received by the phone
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- The phone (client) has to disconnect from its current AP in order to connect to the SoftAP. The original network will get restored only when the provisioning process is complete, and the softAP is taken down.
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5. The SoftAP transport does not require much additional memory for the Wi-Fi use cases.
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6. The SoftAP-based provisioning requires the phone-app user to go to ``System Settings`` to connect to the Wi-Fi network hosted by the device in the iOS system. The discovery (scanning) as well as connection APIs are not available for the iOS applications.
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Deciding on Security
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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Depending on the transport and other constraints the security scheme needs to be selected by the application developers. Following considerations need to be given from the provisioning security perspective:
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1. The configuration data sent from the client to the device and the response has to be secured.
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2. The client should authenticate the device it is connected to.
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3. The device manufacturer may choose proof-of-possession - a unique per device secret to be entered on the provisioning client as a security measure to make sure that the user can provisions the device in the possession.
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There are two levels of security schemes. The developer may select one or combination depending on requirements.
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Depending on the transport and other constraints, the security scheme needs to be selected by the application developers. The following considerations need to be given from the provisioning-security perspective:
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1. *Transport Security:* SoftAP provisioning may choose WPA2 protected security with unique per-device passphrase. Per-device unique passphrase can also act as a proof-of-possession. For BLE, "just-works" security can be used as a transport level security after understanding the level of security it provides.
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2. *Application Security:* The unified provisioning subsystem provides application level security (*security1*) that provides data protection and authentication (through proof-of-possession) if the application does not use the transport level security or if the transport level security is not sufficient for the use-case.
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1. The configuration data sent from the client to the device and the response have to be secured.
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2. The client should authenticate the device that it is connected to.
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3. The device manufacturer may choose proof-of-possession (PoP), a unique per-device secret to be entered on the provisioning client as a security measure to make sure that only the user can provision the device in their possession.
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There are two levels of security schemes, of which the developer may select one or a combination, depending on requirements.
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1. **Transport Security**
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For SoftAP provisioning, developers may choose WPA2-protected security with unique per-device passphrase. Unique per-device passphrase can also act as a proof-of-possession. For Bluetooth LE, the "just-works" security can be used as a transport-level security after assessing its provided level of security.
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2. **Application Security**
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The unified provisioning subsystem provides the application-level security (`Security 1 Scheme`_) that provides data protection and authentication through PoP, if the application does not use the transport-level security, or if the transport-level security is not sufficient for the use case.
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Device Discovery
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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The advertisement and device discovery is left to the application and depending on the protocol chosen, the phone apps and device firmware application can choose appropriate method to advertise and discovery.
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The advertisement and device discovery is left to the application and depending on the protocol chosen, the phone apps and device-firmware application can choose appropriate method for advertisement and discovery.
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For the SoftAP+HTTP transport, typically the SSID (network name) of the AP hosted by the device can be used for discovery.
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For the BLE transport device name or primary service included in the advertisement or combination of both can be used for discovery.
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For the Bluetooth LE transport, device name or primary service included in the advertisement or a combination of both can be used for discovery.
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Architecture
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>>>>>>>>>>>>
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The below diagram shows architecture of unified provisioning.
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The below diagram shows the architecture of unified provisioning:
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.. figure:: ../../../_static/unified_provisioning.png
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:align: center
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@ -95,31 +125,44 @@ The below diagram shows architecture of unified provisioning.
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Unified Provisioning Architecture
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It relies on the base layer called :doc:`protocomm` (Protocol Communication) which provides a framework for security schemes and transport mechanisms. Wi-Fi Provisioning layer uses Protocomm to provide simple callbacks to the application for setting the configuration and getting the Wi-Fi status. The application has control over implementation of these callbacks. In addition application can directly use protocomm to register custom handlers.
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It relies on the base layer called :doc:`protocomm` (protocomm) which provides a framework for security schemes and transport mechanisms. The Wi-Fi Provisioning layer uses protocomm to provide simple callbacks to the application for setting the configuration and getting the Wi-Fi status. The application has control over implementation of these callbacks. In addition, the application can directly use protocomm to register custom handlers.
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Application creates a protocomm instance which is mapped to a specific transport and specific security scheme. Each transport in the protocomm has a concept of an "end-point" which corresponds to logical channel for communication for specific type of information. For example security handshake happens on a different endpoint than the Wi-Fi configuration endpoint. Each end-point is identified using a string and depending on the transport internal representation of the end-point changes. In case of SoftAP+HTTP transport the end-point corresponds to URI whereas in case of BLE the end-point corresponds to GATT characteristic with specific UUID. Developers can create custom end-points and implement handler for the data that is received or sent over the same end-point.
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The application creates a protocomm instance which is mapped to a specific transport and specific security scheme. Each transport in the protocomm has a concept of an "end-point" which corresponds to the logical channel for communication for specific type of information. For example, security handshake happens on a different endpoint from the Wi-Fi configuration endpoint. Each end-point is identified using a string and depending on the transport internal representation of the end-point changes. In case of the SoftAP+HTTP transport, the end-point corresponds to URI, whereas in case of Bluetooth LE, the end-point corresponds to the GATT characteristic with specific UUID. Developers can create custom end-points and implement handler for the data that is received or sent over the same end-point.
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.. _provisioning_security_schemes:
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Security Schemes
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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At present, unified provisioning supports the following security schemes:
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1. Security0 - No security (No encryption)
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2. Security1 - Curve25519-based key exchange, shared key derivation and AES256-CTR mode encryption of the data. It supports two modes :
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a. Authorized - Proof of Possession (PoP) string used to authorize session and derive shared key
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b. No Auth (Null PoP) - Shared key derived through key exchange only
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3. Security2 - SRP6a-based shared key derivation and AES256-GCM mode encryption of the data.
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At present, the unified provisioning supports the following security schemes:
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.. note:: The respective security schemes need to be enabled through the project configuration menu. Please refer to the Enabling protocom security version section in :doc:`protocomm` (Protocol Communication) for more details.
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1. Security 0
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Security1 Scheme
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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No security (No encryption).
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Security1 scheme details are shown in the below sequence diagram -
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2. Security 1
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Curve25519-based key exchange, shared key derivation and AES256-CTR mode encryption of the data. It supports two modes :
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a. Authorized - Proof of Possession (PoP) string used to authorize session and derive shared key.
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b. No Auth (Null PoP) - Shared key derived through key exchange only.
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3. Security 2
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SRP6a-based shared key derivation and AES256-GCM mode encryption of the data.
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.. note::
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The respective security schemes need to be enabled through the project configuration menu. Please refer to :ref:`enabling-protocomm-security-version` for more details.
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Security 1 Scheme
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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The Security 1 scheme details are shown in the below sequence diagram:
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.. seqdiag::
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:caption: Security1
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:caption: Security 1
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:align: center
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seqdiag security1 {
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@ -151,17 +194,19 @@ Security1 scheme details are shown in the below sequence diagram -
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}
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Security2 Scheme
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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Security 2 Scheme
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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Security2 scheme is based on the Secure Remote Password (SRP6a) protocol - `RFC 5054 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5054>`_.
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The protocol requires the Salt and Verifier to be generated beforehand with help of the identifying username ``I`` and the plaintext password ``p``. The Salt and Verifier are then stored on {IDF_TARGET_NAME}.
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- The password ``p`` and username ``I`` are to be provided to the Phone App (Provisioning entity) by suitable means for example QR code sticker.
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The Security 2 scheme is based on the Secure Remote Password (SRP6a) protocol, see `RFC 5054 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5054>`_.
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Security2 scheme details are shown in the below sequence diagram -
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The protocol requires the Salt and Verifier to be generated beforehand with the help of the identifying username ``I`` and the plaintext password ``p``. The Salt and Verifier are then stored on {IDF_TARGET_NAME}.
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- The password ``p`` and the username ``I`` are to be provided to the Phone App (Provisioning entity) by suitable means, e.g., QR code sticker.
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Details about the Security 2 scheme are shown in the below sequence diagram:
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.. seqdiag::
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:caption: Security2
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:caption: Security 2
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:align: center
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seqdiag security2 {
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@ -208,7 +253,7 @@ Security2 scheme details are shown in the below sequence diagram -
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Device generate device_proof M2 = H(A, M, K)"];
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DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "Initialization\nVector", leftnote = "dev_rand = gen_16byte_random()
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This random number is to be used for AES-GCM operation
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for encryption and decryption of data using the shared secret"];
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for encryption and decryption of the data using the shared secret"];
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DEVICE -> CLIENT [label = "SessionResp1(device_proof M2, dev_rand)"];
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CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "Verify Device", rightnote = "Client calculates device proof M2 as M2 = H(A, M, K)
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client verifies this M2 with M2 obtained from device"];
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@ -216,6 +261,7 @@ Security2 scheme details are shown in the below sequence diagram -
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Sample Code
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>>>>>>>>>>>
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Please refer to :doc:`protocomm` and :doc:`wifi_provisioning` for API guides and code snippets on example usage.
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Application implementation can be found as an example under :example:`provisioning`.
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@ -226,13 +272,13 @@ Provisioning Tools
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Provisioning applications are available for various platforms, along with source code:
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* Android:
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* `BLE Provisioning app on Play Store <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.espressif.provble>`_.
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* `Bluetooth LE Provisioning app on Play Store <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.espressif.provble>`_.
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* `SoftAP Provisioning app on Play Store <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.espressif.provsoftap>`_.
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* Source code on GitHub: `esp-idf-provisioning-android <https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf-provisioning-android>`_.
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* iOS:
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* `BLE Provisioning app on app store <https://apps.apple.com/in/app/esp-ble-provisioning/id1473590141>`_.
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* `SoftAP Provisioning app on app Store <https://apps.apple.com/in/app/esp-softap-provisioning/id1474040630>`_.
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* `Bluetooth LE Provisioning app on App Store <https://apps.apple.com/in/app/esp-ble-provisioning/id1473590141>`_.
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* `SoftAP Provisioning app on App Store <https://apps.apple.com/in/app/esp-softap-provisioning/id1474040630>`_.
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* Source code on GitHub: `esp-idf-provisioning-ios <https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf-provisioning-ios>`_.
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* Linux/MacOS/Windows : :idf:`tools/esp_prov` (a python based command line tool for provisioning)
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* Linux/macOS/Windows: :idf:`tools/esp_prov`, a Python-based command line tool for provisioning.
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The phone applications offer simple UI and thus more user centric, while the command line application is useful as a debugging tool for developers.
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The phone applications offer simple UI and are thus more user centric, while the command-line application is useful as a debugging tool for developers.
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@ -1 +1,284 @@
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.. include:: ../../../en/api-reference/provisioning/provisioning.rst
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:orphan:
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统一配网
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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:link_to_translation:`en:[English]`
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概述
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>>>>>>>>
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ESP-IDF 支持统一配网，提供可扩展的机制，支持开发者使用不同传输方式和安全方案配置设备的 Wi-Fi 凭证和其他自定义配置。ESP-IDF 为不同的使用场景提供完整可用的 Wi-Fi 配网解决方案，并附带 iOS 和 Android 示例应用程序。开发者可以扩展设备端和手机应用端实现，来满足发送额外自定义配置数据的需求。以下为该实现的重要功能：
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1. **可扩展协议**
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该协议高度灵活，支持开发者在配网过程中发送自定义配置，以及在应用程序中自定义数据格式。
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2. **传输方式灵活**
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该协议可以作为 Wi-Fi（SoftAP + HTTP 服务器）或低功耗蓝牙上的传输方式，并且可轻松应用于任何支持请求—响应行为的传输方式。
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3. **安全方案灵活**
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配网过程中，各使用场景可能需要不同安全方案来保护传输的数据。部分应用程序可能使用 WPA2 保护的 SoftAP 或具有“即插即用 (just-works)”安全方案的低功耗蓝牙。亦或者，应用程序可能认为传输不安全，需要应用层的安全方案。统一配网框架支持应用程序根据需要选择合适的安全方案。
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4. **数据格式紧凑**
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该协议使用 `Google Protobufs <https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/>`_ 作为会话设置和 Wi-Fi 配网的数据格式。该方案提供紧凑的数据格式，并可以使用不同编程语言进行数据解析。请注意，该配网的应用数据格式并不只局限于 Protobufs，开发者可以自行选择自己想用的数据格式。
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配网过程示例
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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.. seqdiag::
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:caption: 配网过程示例
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:align: center
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seqdiag typical-prov-process {
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activation = none;
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node_width = 80;
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node_height = 60;
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edge_length = 360;
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span_height = 5;
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default_shape = roundedbox;
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default_fontsize = 12;
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CLIENT [label = "客户端"];
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DEVICE [label = "设备"];
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|
||||
=== 1. 特定传输方式的发现和连接 ===
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="某种形式的信标广播"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="客户端连接"];
|
||||
=== 2. 建立会话 ====
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="获取版本请求"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="获取版本响应"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="会话设置请求"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="会话设置响应"];
|
||||
CLIENT --> DEVICE;
|
||||
... 不同协议包含的步骤可能不同 ...
|
||||
DEVICE --> CLIENT
|
||||
=== 3. 配置 ===
|
||||
CLIENT --> DEVICE [label="特定应用程序的配置设置（可选）"];
|
||||
DEVICE --> CLIENT [label="配置设置响应（可选）"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="Wi-Fi 配置设置（SSID、密码等）"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="Wi-Fi 配置设置响应"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="Wi-Fi 配置应用命令"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="Wi-Fi 配置应用响应"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label="Wi-Fi 获取状态命令（重复）"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="Wi-Fi 获取状态响应（重复）"];
|
||||
=== 4. 关闭连接 ===
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label="关闭连接"];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
选择传输方式
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
统一配网支持 Wi-Fi（SoftAP + HTTP 服务器）和低功耗蓝牙（基于 GATT）传输方式。要选择最佳传输方式，需要考虑以下几点：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 基于低功耗蓝牙的传输方式的优势在于，在配网过程中，设备和客户端之间的低功耗蓝牙通信通道稳定，可以提供可靠的配网反馈信息。
|
||||
2. 基于低功耗蓝牙的配网实现可以提升手机应用的用户体验，因为在 Android 和 iOS 系统中，用户可以直接在手机应用内发现并连接设备。
|
||||
3. 然而，低功耗蓝牙传输在运行时会占用约 110 KB 内存。如果产品在配网完成后不再使用低功耗蓝牙或经典蓝牙功能，几乎所有内存都可以回收并添加到堆中。
|
||||
4. 基于 SoftAP 的传输方式兼容性很强，但以下两点需要关注：
|
||||
|
||||
- 设备使用同一频段来托管 SoftAP 以及连接到配置的 AP。由于 AP 可能位于不同信道，可能导致手机无法可靠地接收到连接状态更新。
|
||||
|
||||
- 手机（即客户端）必须先断开与当前 AP 的连接才能连接到 SoftAP。配网过程完成并且 SoftAP 关闭后，原始网络才会恢复。
|
||||
|
||||
5. 使用 SoftAP 传输方式时，不需要为 Wi-Fi 使用场景分配太多额外内存。
|
||||
6. 在 iOS 系统中，如果使用基于 SoftAP 的配网，用户需要将手机切换到 ``系统设置`` 页面，手动连接 Wi-Fi 热点。由于 iOS 系统限制，iOS 应用程序中无法使用发现（即扫描）和连接 API。
|
||||
|
||||
选择安全方案
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
应用程序开发者需要根据传输方式和其他限制选择相应安全方案。从配网安全角度，需要考虑以下因素：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 必须保护客户端发送的配置数据安全以及设备响应数据安全。
|
||||
2. 客户端应该对连接的设备进行身份验证。
|
||||
3. 设备制造商可以使用所有权证明 (proof-of-possession, PoP) 这一安全措施，即为每个设备配置一个独特的设备密钥。设备配网时需要输入该密钥，以确保只有设备的合法持有者可以对其进行配网。
|
||||
|
||||
有两种安全方案层级可供选择，开发者可以根据需求选择其中一种或结合使用。
|
||||
|
||||
1. **传输层安全**
|
||||
|
||||
对于 SoftAP 配网，可以使用 WPA2 保护的安全方案，则每个设备都会有唯一密码，且该密码也可以用作 PoP。对于低功耗蓝牙配网，在考量其支持的安全层级后，可以使用“即插即用”方案保护传输层的安全。
|
||||
|
||||
2. **应用程序层安全**
|
||||
|
||||
统一配网子系统支持应用层的安全方案 (`Security 1 方案`_)，即通过 PoP 提供数据保护和身份验证。如果应用程序不使用传输层的安全方案，或者传输层的安全方案不满足使用场景的需求，可以使用该方案。
|
||||
|
||||
设备发现
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
广播和设备发现由应用程序自行处理。根据所选协议，手机应用程序和设备固件应用程序可以选择适当的广播和发现方法。
|
||||
|
||||
对于 SoftAP + HTTP 传输方式，通常可以通过设备托管 AP 的 SSID（网络名称）发现。
|
||||
|
||||
对于低功耗蓝牙传输方式，可以使用设备名称或包含在广播中的主要服务 (Primary service) 进行发现，也可以将两者结合。
|
||||
|
||||
架构
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
以下图表展示了统一配网的架构：
|
||||
|
||||
.. figure:: ../../../_static/unified_provisioning.png
|
||||
:align: center
|
||||
:alt: 统一配网架构
|
||||
|
||||
统一配网架构
|
||||
|
||||
统一配网依赖名为 :doc:`protocomm` (protocomm) 的基础层，该层提供了安全方案和传输机制的框架。Wi-Fi 配网层使用 protocomm 提供简单的回调函数，供应用程序设置配置和获取 Wi-Fi 状态。应用程序可以控制这些回调的实现方式。此外，应用程序还可以直接使用 protocomm 来注册自定义处理程序。
|
||||
|
||||
应用程序会创建一个 protocomm 实例，该实例会映射到特定传输方式和安全方案。protocomm 中的每个传输方式都有“端点”概念，对应特定类型信息通信的逻辑通道。例如，进行安全握手的端点与 Wi-Fi 配置端点不同。每个端点都用字符串标识，具体取决于传输内部对端点变化的表示方式。对于 SoftAP + HTTP 传输方式，端点对应 URI；而对于低功耗蓝牙，端点对应具有特定 UUID 的 GATT 特征。开发者可以创建自定义端点，为同一端点接收或发送的数据实现处理程序。
|
||||
|
||||
.. _provisioning_security_schemes:
|
||||
|
||||
安全方案
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
目前，统一配网支持以下安全方案：
|
||||
|
||||
1. Security 0
|
||||
|
||||
无安全功能（即无加密）。
|
||||
|
||||
2. Security 1
|
||||
|
||||
基于 Curve25519 的密钥交换、共享密钥派生和 AES256-CTR 模式的数据加密。该方案支持两种模式：
|
||||
|
||||
a. 授权模式 - 使用 PoP 字符串授权会话以及派生共享密钥。
|
||||
|
||||
b. 无授权模式（不启用 PoP）- 仅通过密钥交换派生共享密钥。
|
||||
|
||||
3. Security 2
|
||||
|
||||
基于 SRP6a 的共享密钥派生和 AES256-GCM 模式的数据加密。
|
||||
|
||||
.. note::
|
||||
|
||||
要启用相应安全方案，需要设置项目配置菜单，更多详情请参考 :ref:`enabling-protocomm-security-version`。
|
||||
|
||||
Security 1 方案
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
以下时序图展示了 Security 1 方案的详情：
|
||||
|
||||
.. seqdiag::
|
||||
:caption: Security 1
|
||||
:align: center
|
||||
|
||||
seqdiag security1 {
|
||||
activation = none;
|
||||
node_width = 80;
|
||||
node_height = 60;
|
||||
edge_length = 480;
|
||||
span_height = 5;
|
||||
default_shape = roundedbox;
|
||||
default_fontsize = 12;
|
||||
|
||||
CLIENT [label = "客户端"];
|
||||
DEVICE [label = "设备"];
|
||||
|
||||
=== Security 1 ===
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "生成密钥对", rightnote = "{cli_privkey, cli_pubkey} = curve25519_keygen()"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label = "SessionCmd0(cli_pubkey)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "生成密钥对", leftnote = "{dev_privkey, dev_pubkey} = curve25519_keygen()"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "初始化向量", leftnote = "dev_rand = gen_16byte_random()"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "共享密钥", leftnote = "shared_key(No PoP) = curve25519(dev_privkey, cli_pubkey) \nshared_key(with PoP) = curve25519(dev_privkey, cli_pubkey) ^ SHA256(pop)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label = "SessionResp0(dev_pubkey, dev_rand)"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "共享密钥", rightnote = "shared_key(No PoP) = curve25519(cli_privkey, dev_pubkey)\nshared_key(with PoP) = curve25519(cli_privkey, dev_pubkey) ^ SHA256(pop)"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "验证令牌", rightnote = "cli_verify = aes_ctr_enc(key=shared_key, data=dev_pubkey, nonce=dev_rand)"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label = "SessionCmd1(cli_verify)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "验证客户端", leftnote = "check (dev_pubkey == aes_ctr_dec(cli_verify...)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "验证令牌", leftnote = "dev_verify = aes_ctr_enc(key=shared_key, data=cli_pubkey, nonce=(prev-context))"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label = "SessionResp1(dev_verify)"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "验证设备", rightnote = "check (cli_pubkey == aes_ctr_dec(dev_verify...)"];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Security 2 方案
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
Security 2 方案基于 Secure Remote Password (SRP6a) 协议，详情请参阅 `RFC 5054 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5054>`_。
|
||||
|
||||
该协议要求预先使用标识用户名 ``I`` 和明文密码 ``p`` 生成盐值 (salt) 和验证器 (verifier)，然后将盐值和验证器存储在 {IDF_TARGET_NAME}。
|
||||
|
||||
- 应通过适当方式（例如二维码贴纸）将密码 ``p`` 和用户名 ``I`` 提供给手机应用程序（即配网实体）。
|
||||
|
||||
以下时序图展示了 Security 2 方案的详情：
|
||||
|
||||
.. seqdiag::
|
||||
:caption: Security 2
|
||||
:align: center
|
||||
|
||||
seqdiag security2 {
|
||||
activation = none;
|
||||
node_width = 80;
|
||||
node_height = 60;
|
||||
edge_length = 550;
|
||||
span_height = 5;
|
||||
default_shape = roundedbox;
|
||||
default_fontsize = 12;
|
||||
|
||||
CLIENT [label = "客户端\n（手机应用）"];
|
||||
DEVICE [label = "设备\n(ESP)"];
|
||||
|
||||
=== Security 2 ===
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "生成密钥对", rightnote = "a (cli_privkey) = 256 位随机值,
|
||||
A (cli_pubkey) = g^a.
|
||||
g - 生成器，N - 大安全质数，
|
||||
所有计算操作都在模 N 的整数环中执行，
|
||||
因此所有类似 y^z 的数据应读为 y^z 对 N 取模的结果"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label = "SessionCmd0(cli_pubkey A, username I)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "获取盐值和验证器", leftnote = "获取在 ESP 上存储的盐值和验证器
|
||||
盐值 s = 256 位随机值
|
||||
验证器 v = g^x，其中 x = H(s | I | p)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "生成密钥对", leftnote = "b (dev_privkey) = 256 位随机值
|
||||
B(dev_pubkey) = k*v + g^b，其中 k = H(N, g)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "共享密钥", leftnote = "共享密钥 K = H(S)，其中
|
||||
S = (A * v^u) ^ b
|
||||
u = H(A, B)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label = "SessionResp0(dev_pubkey B, dev_rand)"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "共享密钥", rightnote = "shared_key(K) = H(S)，其中
|
||||
S = (B - k*v) ^ (a + ux),
|
||||
u = H(A, B),
|
||||
k = H(N, g),
|
||||
v = g^x,
|
||||
x = H(s | I | p).
|
||||
|
||||
"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "验证令牌", rightnote = "client_proof M = H[H(N) XOR H(g) | H(I) | s | A | B | K]"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> DEVICE [label = "SessionCmd1(client_proof M1)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "验证客户端", leftnote = "设备生成 M1 = H[H(N) XOR H(g) | H(I) | s | A | B | K]
|
||||
设备将该 M1 值与从客户端获得的 M1 进行验证"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "验证令牌", leftnote = "
|
||||
设备生成 device_proof M2 = H(A, M, K)"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> DEVICE [label = "初始化向量", leftnote = "dev_rand = gen_16byte_random()
|
||||
该随机数通常用作 AES-GCM 操作，
|
||||
并使用共享密钥加密和解密数据"];
|
||||
DEVICE -> CLIENT [label = "SessionResp1(device_proof M2, dev_rand)"];
|
||||
CLIENT -> CLIENT [label = "验证设备", rightnote = "客户端计算设备证明 M2 = H(A, M, K)，
|
||||
客户端将该 M2 值与从设备获得的 M2 进行验证"];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
示例代码
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
关于 API 指南和示例用法的代码片段，请参阅 :doc:`protocomm` 和 :doc:`wifi_provisioning`。
|
||||
|
||||
关于应用程序的实现示例，请参阅 :example:`provisioning`。
|
||||
|
||||
配网工具
|
||||
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
|
||||
|
||||
以下为各平台的配网应用程序，包括源代码：
|
||||
|
||||
* Android:
|
||||
* `Play Store 上的低功耗蓝牙配网应用程序 <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.espressif.provble>`_。
|
||||
* `Play Store 上的 SoftAP 配网应用程序 <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.espressif.provsoftap>`_。
|
||||
* GitHub 上的源代码：`esp-idf-provisioning-android <https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf-provisioning-android>`_。
|
||||
* iOS:
|
||||
* `App Store 上的低功耗蓝牙配网应用程序 <https://apps.apple.com/in/app/esp-ble-provisioning/id1473590141>`_。
|
||||
* `App Store 上的 SoftAP 配网应用程序 <https://apps.apple.com/in/app/esp-softap-provisioning/id1474040630>`_。
|
||||
* GitHub 上的源代码：`esp-idf-provisioning-ios <https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf-provisioning-ios>`_。
|
||||
* Linux/macOS/Windows：基于 Python 的命令行工具 :idf:`tools/esp_prov`，可用于设备配网。
|
||||
|
||||
手机应用程序界面简洁，便于用户使用，而开发者可以使用命令行应用程序，便于调试。
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user