Merge branch 'feature/secure_boot_key_check_before_revoke_v4.3' into 'release/v4.3'

Check if the running app is signed by a valid key before revocation (v4.3)

See merge request espressif/esp-idf!15293
This commit is contained in:
Mahavir Jain 2021-09-24 04:03:40 +00:00
commit 5ab3dd40ba

View File

@ -887,8 +887,8 @@ esp_err_t esp_ota_erase_last_boot_app_partition(void)
}
#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1 && CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
esp_err_t esp_ota_revoke_secure_boot_public_key(esp_ota_secure_boot_public_key_index_t index) {
esp_err_t esp_ota_revoke_secure_boot_public_key(esp_ota_secure_boot_public_key_index_t index)
{
if (!esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure boot v2 has not been enabled.");
return ESP_FAIL;
@ -901,8 +901,70 @@ esp_err_t esp_ota_revoke_secure_boot_public_key(esp_ota_secure_boot_public_key_i
return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
}
ets_secure_boot_revoke_public_key_digest(index);
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Revoked signature block %d.", index);
esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_digests = { 0 };
esp_err_t err = esp_secure_boot_get_signature_blocks_for_running_app(true, &app_digests);
if (err != ESP_OK || app_digests.num_digests == 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "This app is not signed, but check signature on update is enabled in config. It won't be possible to verify any update.");
return ESP_FAIL;
}
ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_keys;
int ets_status = ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_keys);
if (ets_status != ETS_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Could not read the secure boot key digests from efuse. Aborting..");
return ESP_FAIL;
}
if (trusted_keys.key_digests[index] == NULL) {
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Trusted Key block(%d) already revoked.", index);
return ESP_OK;
}
esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t trusted_digests = { 0 };
for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
if (i == index) {
continue; // omitting - to find if there is a valid key after revoking this digest
}
if (trusted_keys.key_digests[i] != NULL) {
bool all_zeroes = true;
for (unsigned j = 0; j < ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
all_zeroes = all_zeroes && (*(uint8_t *)(trusted_keys.key_digests[i] + j) == 0);
}
if (!all_zeroes) {
memcpy(trusted_digests.key_digests[trusted_digests.num_digests++], (uint8_t *)trusted_keys.key_digests[i], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
} else {
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Empty trusted key block (%d).", i);
}
}
}
bool match = false;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < trusted_digests.num_digests; i++) {
if (match == true) {
break;
}
for (unsigned j = 0; j < app_digests.num_digests; j++) {
if (memcmp(trusted_digests.key_digests[i], app_digests.key_digests[j], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN) == 0) {
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "App key block(%d) matches Trusted key block(%d)[%d -> Next active trusted key block].", j, i, i);
esp_err_t err = esp_efuse_set_digest_revoke(index);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to revoke digest (0x%x).", err);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Revoked signature block %d.", index);
match = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (match == false) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Running app doesn't have another valid secure boot key. Cannot revoke current key(%d).", index);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
return ESP_OK;
}
#endif